University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics

Working Papers

2020

Innovation Institutions and the Opioid Crisis
Daniel J. Hemel
Daniel.Hemel@chicagounbound.edui

Lisa Larrimore Ouellette
Lisa.Ouellette@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics_wp
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, "Innovation Institutions and the Opioid Crisis", CoaseSandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, No. 907 (2020).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized
administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Innovation Institutions
and the Opioid Crisis
Daniel Jacob Hemel
University of Chicago - Law School
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette
Stanford Law School

John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Stanford Law School
Stanford, California 94305

Working Paper Series
Paper No. 547

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3534721

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534721

Innovation Institutions and the Opioid Crisis
Daniel J. Hemel1 & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette2
February 21, 2020
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES (forthcoming 2020)
The United States has recently—and belatedly—come to
recognize opioid addiction as a public health crisis. What has gone mostly
unrecognized is the degree to which this crisis is intertwined with U.S.
intellectual property law and related elements of U.S. innovation policy.
Innovation institutions—the legal arrangements that structure incentives
for production and allocation of knowledge goods—encouraged the
development and commercialization of addictive painkillers, restricted
access to opioid antidotes, and (perhaps most importantly) failed to
facilitate investments in alternative, non-addictive treatments for chronic
pain. Although innovation policy does not bear all the blame for the opioid
wave that has washed over communities across the country, innovation
institutions are bound up in the ongoing epidemic to a degree that so far
has gone underappreciated.
This Article examines the proliferation of opioid use and abuse
through the lens of innovation policy, and it envisions ways in which
innovation institutions could help to contain the crisis. Along the way, it
seeks to derive broader lessons for innovation policy scholarship as well as
recommendations for institutional reform. The opioid crisis challenges the
conventional understanding of IP law as a tradeoff between allocative
efficiency and dynamic efficiency; it highlights the potentially pernicious
role of IP protection for addictive and habit-forming products; and it
exposes deep flaws in the structure of federal subsidies for and regulation
of prescription drugs. It also draws attention to the political and cultural
factors that contribute to innovation policy failures. Ultimately, the opioid
crisis underscores both the urgency and the limits of institutional change
in the innovation policy domain.
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Introduction
Opioid overdoses killed an estimated 46,802 people in the United States
in 2018.3 That is a very slight decline from the previous year, but it is still a
stunning number. To put that figure in perspective: More Americans now die
from opioid overdoses than from motor vehicle accidents,4 or from the AIDS
epidemic at its peak.5 Over one-third of U.S. adults are estimated to have used
prescription opioids in 2015, and nearly five percent to have misused them.6 The
ubiquity of opioids not only put those patients who had prescriptions at risk of
addiction but also unleashed a flood of pills that could be used and abused by
family members and friends.7 Prescription opioids further fed into the spread of
other opioids—including heroin, the use of which increased almost five-fold in a
decade,8 and fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that has seen an even more dramatic
and deadly surge. 9 The economic costs of the epidemic are staggering, likely
See Joel Achenbach, U.S. Life Expectancy Ticks Up as Drug Fatalities and Cancer Deaths Drop,
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/us-life-expectancyticks-up-as-drug-fatalities-and-cancer-deaths-drop/2020/01/29/2f663376-4206-11ea-b5fceefa848cde99_story.html. Opioids are drugs that block pain signals by binding to opioid
receptors on nerve cells, including opiates derived from the opium poppy plant, such as heroin,
morphine, and codeine, as well as synthetic opioids such as oxycodone (OxyContin),
hydrocodone (combined with acetaminophen to make Vicodin), and fentanyl. See Opioids, NAT’L
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids (last visited Feb. 8,
2020).
4 See 2017 Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes: Overview, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.
(Oct. 2018), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812603.
5 See Lenny Bernstein & Christopher Ingraham, Fueled by Drug Crisis, U.S. Life Expectancy
Declines for a Second Straight Year, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017), http://wapo.st/2BpGCYG (citing
Stanford University psychiatry and behavioral sciences professor Keith Humphreys); cf. JOSH
BLOOM, AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO AIDS?: HOW THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TAMED HIV 14 fig.8 (2011) (41,699 deaths from AIDS in peak
year of 1995).
6 See Beth Han et al., Prescription Opioid Use, Misuse, and Use Disorders in U.S. Adults: 2015 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 293 (2017).
7 Over half of pain relief misusers obtained their drugs from a friend or relative. See
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL
SURVEY
ON
DRUG
USE
AND
HEALTH
170413
tbl.6.53B
(2017),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2016/NSDUHDetTabs-2016.pdf.
8 See Silvia S. Martins, Aaron Sarvet & Julian Santaella-Tenorio, Changes in US Lifetime Heroin
Use and Heroin Use Disorder: Prevalence from 2001-2002 to 2012-2013 National Epidemiological Survey on
Alcohol and Related Conditions, 74 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 445 (2017). While the share of the U.S.
population that uses heroin remains small (less than two percent of all adults at last count),
roughly four in five heroin users began by abusing prescription opioids. See Pradip K. Muhuri,
Joseph C. Gfroerer & M. Christine Davies, Associations of Nonmedical Pain Reliever Use and Initiation
of Heroin Use in the United States, CBHSQ DATA REVIEW, Aug. 2013,
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/DR006/DR006/nonmedical-pain-relieveruse-2013.htm.
9 See Merianne Rose Spencer et al., Drug Overdose Deaths Involving Fentanyl, 2011—2016, 68
NAT’L
VITAL
STATS.
REPORTS
no.
3,
at
1,
9
tbl,1
(2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr68/nvsr68_03-508.pdf. In recent years, the
synthetic opioid fentanyl has overtaken heroin on the illegal drug market; by 2015, fentanyl and
3
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topping $500 billion annually.10 Without a doubt, the opioid crisis is among the
primary policy challenges facing the United States today.
Two dominant narratives have emerged in scholarly and popular
commentary on the opioid crisis’s causes. One narrative casts opioid abuse as a
“disease of despair”—a byproduct of poverty and lack of economic opportunity
that has hit hardest in deindustrializing regions. 11 This account may capture
some important social trends, but identifying causal mechanisms behind the
growth in opioid overdoses has proven challenging. 12 Econometric evidence
suggests that overdoses have more to do with the availability and cost of drugs
than with regional economic trends. As one prominent health economist recently
wrote, “efforts to improve local economies, while desirable for other reasons, are
not likely to yield significant reductions in overdose mortality.”13
A second narrative—which we refer to as the “disease of deception”
account—emphasizes the role of pharmaceutical companies in hiding addiction
risks from the public even as they aggressively marketed opioids for ever-broader
uses. The chief antagonists in this narrative are members of the Sackler family
that owned and ran Purdue Pharma, the maker of the now-infamous opioid drug
OxyContin. 14 The disease-of-deception narrative draws strong support from
documents that have surfaced in litigation against Purdue Pharma revealing that
company officials knew shortly after OxyContin’s introduction in 1996 that the

its analogs were the leading cause of U.S. drug overdose deaths. Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST.
ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-deathrates (revised Aug. 2018). Fentanyl also has approved medical uses. For a lay overview, see
Kathleen Davis, Everything You Need to Know About Fentanyl, MED. NEWS TODAY (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/308156.php. We are unaware of a study that
measures the percentage of fentanyl users who began by abusing prescription opioids.
10 Opioid-related health care, criminal justice, and lost productivity cost the United States
over $100 billion annually. See CHRIS CHRISTIE ET AL., THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS: FINAL REPORT 31 (2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Report_Draft_11-12017.pdf. If one estimates the value of a statistical life at roughly $10 million, see Cass R. Sunstein,
The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, 4 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 237, 240
(2013), the yearly cost in lost lives is over $400 billion more.
11 See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 397, 398 (2017) (attributing a rise in deaths from
suicide, alcohol, and drug overdoses—which they define as “deaths of despair”—to “a longstanding process of cumulative disadvantage for those with less than a college degree”).
12 On the exponential growth in drug overdose deaths, largely due to opioids, see Hawre Jalal
et al., Changing Dynamics of the Drug Overdose Epidemic from 1979 Through 2016, 361 SCIENCE
eaau1184 fig.1 (2018).
13 Christopher J. Ruhm, Drivers of the Fatal Drug Epidemic, 64 J. HEALTH ECON. 25, 25 (2019);
see also Case & Deaton, supra note 11, at 428 (rejecting economic and income-based accounts for
rising “deaths of despair”).
14 See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family that Built an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct.
30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-anempire-of-pain; Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public
Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221 (2009).
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drug was being abused widely—yet concealed that information from the
public.15
Even Purdue Pharma’s most withering critics do not allege that the
company’s cover-up was the sole cause of the opioid crisis, however. Widespread
OxyContin abuse was a front page news story as early as 2001, when the opioid
epidemic was still in its nascent stage.16 “[N]o prescription drug in the last 20
years has been so widely abused so soon after its release as OxyContin,” the New
York Times reported in May 2001, citing officials at the federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA).17 Talk radio host Rush Limbaugh drew greater attention
to OxyContin in 2003 when he acknowledged on air that he had become
addicted to prescription painkillers. 18 And in 2007, a full decade before the
annual death toll from opioid abuse reached its peak, Purdue Pharma and three
of its executives entered a widely publicized guilty plea to federal criminal
charges of misbranding—charges related to the company’s concealment of
OxyContin’s addictive properties. 19 None of this is to suggest that Purdue
Pharma and other pharmaceutical companies that marketed prescription
opioids are immune from blame for the current crisis. They are not. But
deception alone cannot explain how opioids continued to inundate American
medicine cabinets long after the addiction risks were widely publicized.
How did opioids overwhelm a nation well aware of their addictive
properties, claiming victims across the socioeconomic spectrum? To understand
that, one must understand not only how opioid manufacturers aggressively
marketed their wares and why physicians profligately prescribed these drugs but
also why alternative pain management strategies failed to emerge and why
opioid antidotes and abuse treatments were so much slower to spread. Purdue
Pharma and “pill mills” play a part in this story,20 but so does Medicaid’s “best
price” mandate and the National Institutes of Health’s allocation of research
funding. Comprehending the origins and persistence of the crisis requires a deep

See, e.g., Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely Abused,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioidsoxycontin.html.
16 See Francis X. Clines with Barry Meier, Cancer Painkillers Pose New Abuse Threat, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2001, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/cancer-painkillers-pose-newabuse-threat.html.
17 Barry Meier, U.S. Asks Painkiller Maker to Help Curb Wide Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001,
at A16, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/01/us/us-asks-painkiller-maker-to-help-curbwide-abuse.html.
18 See James Barron, In Show, Limbaugh Tells of a Pill Habit; Plans to Enter Clinic, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2003, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/11/us/in-show-limbaugh-tells-of-apill-habit-plans-to-enter-clinic.html; Evan Thomas, “I Am Addicted to Prescription Pain Medicine,”
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2003), https://www.newsweek.com/i-am-addicted-prescription-painmedication-138721.
19 See Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html.
20 See Chris McGreal, Why Were Millions of Opioid Pills Sent to a West Virginia Town of 3,000?,
GUARDIAN
(LONDON)
(Oct.
2,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/oct/02/opioids-west-virginia-pill-mills-pharmacies.
15
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dive into the organizations and policies that drove the opioid wave as well as
those that failed to produce a robust response.
This Article takes up that task. We suggest that the opioid epidemic is, in
important respects, a disease of design. By this, we do not mean to suggest that the
opioid crisis is the outgrowth of any single person’s grand plan. What we mean
instead is that the design of institutions created conditions that allowed the crisis
to arise and proliferate. We focus in particular on the design of innovation
institutions—the legal arrangements that structure the production and allocation
of knowledge goods. 21 These include intellectual property law (patents, trade
secrets, trademarks, regulatory exclusivity, etc.), but also the regulatory
structures of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that determine whether
knowledge goods can reach the market and the public benefit programs like
Medicare and Medicaid that subsidize access to knowledge goods.22
The design of innovation institutions enabled the opioid epidemic in a
number of ways. First, U.S. innovation institutions produced powerful incentives
for pharmaceutical firms to develop and commercialize highly addictive
prescription pain medicines while imposing weaker constraints on the rollout of
new and more addictive products. Second, systems for allocating access to
medical technologies promoted use of addictive medicines while creating
barriers to access for addiction treatments. Third, innovation institutions
allowed—and indeed, encouraged—manufacturers of opioid antidotes to charge
sky-high prices for products that, if more widely accessible, likely could have
saved the lives of thousands of opioid overdose victims. Fourth, even while
encouraging the rapid diffusion of addictive opioids, innovation institutions
failed to sufficiently reward firms for formulating, refining, or popularizing
alternative treatments for addiction or for the underlying problem of chronic
pain. Again, no one sat down and designed the system to work this way. But a
series of institutional design choices—some conscious, others unconscious—
allowed a perfect storm to coalesce.
Some of these design flaws are relatively familiar. Intellectual property
(IP) is an innovation institution that relies on signals of social value generated by
market mechanisms, and market-generated signals can yield inefficient
allocations of goods in the presence of externalities. Addictive pain-medications
generate negative externalities, and overdose and addiction treatments produce
positive externalities, so it is perhaps unsurprising that America ended up with
too many addictive prescription opioids and too few overdose and addiction
treatments. Furthermore, IP distorts investments in research and development

21 For an overview of the main innovation institutions, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544 (2019).
22 The term “knowledge good” refers to “‘anything that can be digitized.’” Daniel J. Hemel
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101 MINN. L. REV. 167, 168 & n.1
(2016) (quoting HAL VARIAN, MARKETS FOR INFORMATION GOODS 3 (1999)). The knowledge
goods we have in mind here are, principally, pharmacological formulas and therapeutic methods
for the treatment of addiction and pain. Although pharmaceuticals are physical goods as well as
knowledge goods, the primary value lies in the information underlying the product.
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toward patentable technologies like pharmaceuticals,23 so it is no surprise that
the patent-centric U.S. innovation institutions resulted in a nation awash in pills
but wanting for alternative pain treatments.
In other respects, our examination of the role of innovation institutions
in the opioid epidemic challenges traditional understandings of IP in particular
and innovation institutions more broadly. The conventional view posits that IP
policy’s fundamental tradeoff is between innovation and access, or what
economists call dynamic efficiency and allocative efficiency.24 IP incentivizes the
development and commercialization of new and better products (the dynamicefficiency benefit), but it also encourages IP holders to raise prices and restrict
access (the allocative-inefficiency cost). The opioid epidemic presents a
contrasting image of IP’s potential consumption-expanding effects. Opioid
patents induced investments in efforts to create demand for products that
consumers did not previously believe they wanted. 25 This demand-creation
effect was especially powerful because the patented product was habit-forming—
Purdue’s lower prices for OxyContin in the short term could thus raise
consumption in the long term. 26 And this problem was exacerbated by the
effective cost often being lowered through prescription drug insurance. Although
scholars typically view increased use of patented technologies as a welfare gain,
the example of prescription opioids illustrates that patents’ consumptionexpanding effects can be pernicious.
Ideally, the government would counteract the biases embedded in the
patent system through other innovation institutions, including regulations, taxes,
and government-directed financial rewards such as grants and prizes. For
example, market-based prizes in the form of insurance reimbursement policies
appear to be a particularly promising intervention.27 But in the context of pain
treatment, the federal government’s non-patent interventions exacerbated the
skew toward prescription opioids and away from other pain management and
mitigation strategies. At the same time, government policies created barriers that
limited access to addiction treatments. Additionally, and paradoxically, the
federal government’s subsidies for opioid antidotes may have reduced access to
these life-saving products, challenging the view that demand-side subsidies are a
solution to the patent system’s pitfalls.
See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122
YALE L.J. 1900 (2013).
24 See, e.g., Bhaven Sampat and Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation?
Evidence from the Human Genome, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 203, 204 (2019) (“Dating back at least to
analyses such as Nordhaus (1969), optimal patent policy design has traditionally been framed as
a trade-off between this benefit of providing incentives for the development of new technologies
and the cost of deadweight loss from higher prices during the life of the patent.”).
25 The same is true for many non-opioid innovations, of course—which is part of why we
think the story of opioid innovations has lessons for innovation policy more broadly.
26 As we will discuss, the economics literature has demonstrated that it is sometimes rational
to price addictive products even below marginal cost. See infra Section I.B.2.
27 See generally Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive,
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016) (explaining how manipulation of the market through
insurance reimbursement policies feeds back into innovation incentives).
23
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Recognizing the role of America’s innovation institutions in the opioid
epidemic helps inform the search for paths out of the current crisis, but it is
essential to emphasize that no magic-bullet policy will bring the opioid epidemic
to an end. The proliferation of prescription opioids was both a function of
incentives generated by the current innovation ecosystem and a response—
misguided as it may have been—to the very real problem of chronic pain
afflicting an estimated one in five U.S. adults.28 Any comprehensive effort to
curtail opioid abuse will require interventions aimed at addressing chronic pain
in ways that do not put patients at risk of addiction. The solution likely will
involve regulated use of opioids by the populations for which they are justified
as well as both existing and novel nonaddictive analgesics.29 At the same time,
wider access to existing non-pharmacological pain treatments such as
acupuncture, physical therapy, exercise, meditation, and cognitive behavioral
therapy may do as much to mitigate the overuse of prescription opioids as any
pharmacological leap. 30 Moreover, any comprehensive national strategy to
contain the opioid epidemic also will require interventions aimed at individuals
already in the throes of addiction (medically known as “substance use disorder”
or “opioid use disorder”).31 Initiatives at the federal, state, and local level suggest
progress in this regard, though still on a scale far too small relative to the problem
that they aim to solve.32
This Article is an attempt to understand how innovation institutions are
bound up in the opioid crisis, how they might help to bring the crisis to an end,
and what lessons the opioid crisis offers for innovation policy going forward. Part
I investigates the relationship between innovation institutions and the sky-high
rates of opioid use, abuse, and overdose. Part II draws on insights from the study
of innovation policy and comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the ways
in which innovation institutions can respond to the opioid epidemic. For
example, distortions caused by patent law might be addressed through
interventions in areas such as FDA regulation, tort law, and antitrust. And direct
public support can address problems on both the incentive and allocation side of
innovation policy. As we discuss, there are significant political hurdles to reform,
although it is at least promising that opioid misuse is now being viewed as a

See James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain Among Adults
— United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1001 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6736a2.htm.
29 See, e.g., infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text (describing recent randomized
controlled trials suggesting that certain non-opioids are as effective as opioids at treating both
acute and chronic pain).
30 See infra note 216 and accompanying text (describing a call from the National Academies
for more research in these areas).
31 See Allison L. Pitt, Keith Humphreys & Margaret L. Brandeau, Modeling Health Benefits and
Harms of Public Policy Responses to the US Opioid Epidemic, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1394 (2018).
32 Cf. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Richard G. Frank, Making the Opioid Public Health Emergency
Effective, 75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 767, 767 (2018) (describing four aspects of the opioid crisis that
meet the federal definition of a public health emergency and arguing that the epidemic “requires
much greater funds, quickly”).
28
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public health problem. Finally, Part III asks what lessons we can learn from the
opioid crisis for innovation policy more broadly.

I. The Opioid Epidemic as a Failure of Innovation Institutions
Although a number of social, economic, and political factors have fueled
the opioid epidemic, three phenomena in particular have contributed to the
epidemic’s spread and severity: (1) the proliferation of prescription opioids from
the late 1990s onwards, (2) restrictions on access to opioid antidotes and
medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder, and (3) the limited
availability of non-pharmacological treatments or studies on new uses of
nonaddictive existing drugs for either chronic pain or addiction. Each of these
phenomena involves the production and allocation of knowledge goods. This
Part highlights the role of America’s innovation institutions in fueling these
trends, while also recognizing the complexity of this history and the influence of
other actors and structures.
To illustrate how innovation institutions are bound up in the opioid crisis,
we begin in Section I.A with the stories of three pharmaceutical knowledge goods
that have affected different aspects of the epidemic: (1) OxyContin, a controlledrelease form of an opioid called oxycodone, for treatment of chronic pain;
(2) Suboxone, a treatment for opioid use disorder; and (3) Evzio, a device for
injecting medicine to halt opioid overdoses. Of course, these three drugs capture
only part of the story of the American opioid epidemic. For one thing, as we
discuss in more detail below, OxyContin is just one of many opioids contributing
to the overdose epidemic; Suboxone is just one among several drugs used to treat
opioid use disorder; and Evzio is not the only delivery mechanism for overdose
treatments. Nonetheless, the histories of OxyContin, Suboxone, and Evzio
capture important aspects of the opioid epidemic’s emergence and expansion,
helping us show how America became awash in prescription opioids and not in
the drugs needed to treat addiction and reverse overdoses.
Sections I.B–D then relate these narratives to specific innovation
institutions: intellectual property law (including patents, regulatory exclusivity,
and their antitrust limits), institutions for ex ante and ex post drug regulation,
and public benefit programs that subsidize access to pharmaceuticals and health
care. All of these institutions are deeply intertwined with the opioid epidemic,
though often in tangled ways.
In Section I.E, we turn to the innovations that existing institutions failed
to produce for treating both pain and opioid addiction. Opioids are not the only
(and often likely not the best) way to treat chronic pain; pharmaceuticals may
not be the only effective treatment for addiction;33 and the Evzio injector is not
the only way to a halt an opioid overdose. Yet American innovation institutions
33 Evidence of the efficacy of medication assisted treatment for opioid use disorder is,
however, quite robust. For an overview, see Hilary Smith Connery, Medication-Assisted Treatment
of Opioid Use Disorder: Review of the Evidence and Future Directions, 23 HARV. J. ON PSYCHIATRY 63
(2015).
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failed to promote the development and commercialization of alternative
treatments involving existing drugs or non-pharmacological interventions. This
is—if not quite by conscious design—nonetheless a byproduct of the design of
innovation institutions, which promote technologies that are amenable to IP
protection but provide insufficient incentives for technologies that are not. And
while non-IP policies potentially can offset some of the IP system’s biases, the
U.S. federal government’s non-IP interventions have often done the opposite—
exacerbating rather than mitigating the failures of patent-centric innovation
institutions.
A. A Tale of Three Drugs
1. The $35 Billion Question: What Explains OxyContin’s Rise?
In the early 1990s, MS Contin, a controlled-release form of morphine
sulfate, was generating millions of dollars in sales for Purdue Pharma.34 But MS
Contin no longer had IP-protected exclusivity,35 and Purdue expected generic
competition to eat into its profits.36 The firm pivoted to a new pain-treatment
market strategy. In November 1993, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) granted Purdue’s application for Patent No. 5,266,331, which claimed a
controlled-release form of the opioid oxycodone.37 Just over two years later, in
December 1995, the FDA approved Purdue’s application to market OxyContin
for treatment of chronic pain.38 Purdue’s strategy, according to its 1996 budget
plan, was “to switch patients who would have been started on MS [Contin] to
OxyContin, as quickly as possible.”39
The new drug would prove to be a commercial blockbuster. Purdue
Pharma set the price of OxyContin at levels that put it within reach even of
patients who lacked prescription drug coverage: $1.25 per 10-milligram tablet
as of 2000. 40 The number of OxyContin prescriptions dispensed nationwide

See Purdue and the OxyContin Files, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 13, 2018),
https://khn.org/news/purdue-and-the-oxycontin-files (page 61 of 1996 Budget Plan).
35 Although numerous articles describe Purdue as having a patent on MS Contin that was set
to expire around 1995, no such patent is listed in the FDA Orange Book in the 1980s or 1990s;
rather, Purdue had regulatory exclusivity that expired in 1990. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS AD27 (10th
ed. 1990) (listing MS Contin as having new dosage form exclusivity that would expire on May
29, 1990, and no listed patents), http://data.nber.org/fda/orange-book/historical/19862016/1_orange_book_PDFs/full_books_1980-2016/1990.pdf.
36 See Purdue and the OxyContin Files, supra note 34 (page 6 of 1996 Budget Plan).
37 U.S. Patent No. 5,266,331 (filed Nov. 27, 1991; issued Nov. 30, 1993).
38 Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm338566.htm
(last
updated Nov. 28, 2018).
39 See Purdue and the OxyContin Files, supra note 34 (page 6 of 1996 Budget Plan).
40 See OxyContin Diversion and Abuse, NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR. (Jan. 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs/651/abuse.htm.
34
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each year reached six million that year, bringing in over $1 billion in sales.41
Thanks to its patent rights, Purdue Pharma controlled the entire controlledrelease oxycodone market until 2005.42 Due to a temporary patent litigation loss,
generics briefly captured up to a third of the market in terms of number of
prescriptions, but Purdue ultimately prevailed in litigation and forced
competitors out of the market by 2010. 43 In 2010, Purdue also engaged in
“product hopping” 44 by replacing its original OxyContin formulation with a
new “abuse-deterrent” formulation, which is protected until 2030 by laterexpiring patents. 45 (The new crush-resistant formulation seems to have been
only moderately effective at deterring abuse.46) By 2018, Purdue Pharma’s alltime total OxyContin revenue topped $35 billion.47
To be clear, OxyContin is just one of several prescription opioids that
have contributed to America’s overdose epidemic. In a recently released federal
database, Purdue ranked fourth among prescription opioid manufacturers from
2006 to 2012, with just over three percent of the market.48 This small market
share likely understates Purdue’s role in the epidemic, however. OxyContin was

See GARDENIA HARRIS, JOHN Q. HODGES & CAROL A. SNIVELY, OXYCONTIN IN
MISSOURI: A POLICY BRIEF EXPLORING PATTERNS OF ABUSE, PREVENTION, TREATMENT
AND INTERDICTION STRATEGIES 8 (2002); Van Zee, supra note 14, at 221.
42 See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (withdrawing
a 2005 opinion that had affirmed a judgment that Purdue’s patents were unenforceable for
inequitable conduct—which had allowed generic oxycodone launches—and instead concluding
that the generic manufacturer’s product would infringe Purdue’s patents); Catherine S. Hwang,
Hsien-Yen Chang & G. Caleb Alexander, Impact of Abuse-Deterrent OxyContin on Prescription Opioid
Utilization, 24 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 197, 198–200 (2015) (describing the
history of generic oxycodone launches and then removal from the market due to patent
settlements and showing Purdue versus generic sales numbers).
43 See Hwang et al., supra note 42, at 199 fig.1.
44 See generally Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2016) (describing this practice and providing a framework for
antitrust analysis).
45 See Hwang et al., supra note 42, at 200 tbl.1; Patent and Exclusivity for N022272, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
ORANGE
BOOK,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/Cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001&Appl_
No=022272&Appl_type=N (last visited July 21, 2019). Some of these patents have been found
invalid as obvious. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Epic Pharma, LLC, 811 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
46 See Hwang et al., supra note 42, at 200–01.
47 See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family that Build an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empireof-pain; OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma to Stop Marketing Opioids to Doctors, MARKETPLACE (Feb.
10, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/02/10/health-care/uncertain-hour/oxycontinmaker-purdue-pharma-stop-marketing-opioids-doctors (citing data from IQVIA).
48 See Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz & Steven Rich, 76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal
Data
Unmasks
the
Epidemic,
WASH.
POST.
(July
16,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/76-billion-opioid-pills-newly-releasedfederal-data-unmasks-the-epidemic/2019/07/16/5f29fd62-a73e-11e9-86ddd7f0e60391e9_story.html.
41
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for a time the “drug of choice among abusers,”49 and it still appears to be the
most abused single-entity prescription painkiller.50 Approximately 14.1 percent of
adults who reported misuse of a prescription pain reliever in 2015 said they
misused OxyContin specifically.51 Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest
that oxycodone is more prone to abuse than other common opioids.52 A recent
empirical study of cross-state variation in OxyContin exposure concluded that
“the recent heroin epidemic is largely due to the reformulation of OxyContin.”53
Additionally, some of Purdue’s efforts to promote controlled-release oxycodone
may have had spillover effects on other opioid products.54
Our focus on OxyContin should not be misinterpreted as a monocausal
explanation for what is in fact an epidemic with multiple and converging root
causes. Rather, its prominence makes it a useful example for illustrating the
relationship between opioids and innovation institutions. But before we turn to
this relationship, we introduce two other illustrative drugs—each of which might
have done more to contain the epidemic had it been more widely distributed:
Suboxone and Evzio.
2. Medication Assisted Treatment: Why Is It Harder to Access
Addiction Treatments than Addictive Drugs?
Rising addiction to opioids such as OxyContin has been accompanied
by growing business interest in drugs for treating individuals suffering from
opioid use disorder, which are commonly described as medication-assisted
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND
DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 33 (2003).
50 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2016
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES 170525 tbl. 1.97A (Sept.
7,
2017),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs2016/NSDUH-DetTabs-2016.pdf.
51 Id. That figure dropped to 12.5 percent in 2015. Id. Note that this does not mean that
OxyContin accounted for 14.1 percent of all misused prescription pain relievers, because some
OxyContin misusers may have misused other prescription pain relievers as well.
52 See Rachel Wightman et al., Likeability and Abuse Liability of Commonly Prescribed Opioids, 8 J.
MED. TOXICOLOGY 335 (2012) (“Oral oxycodone has a substantially elevated abuse liability
profile compared to oral morphine and hydrocodone due to high likability scores and a relative
lack of negative subjective effects.”). Cf. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
supra note 50, at 170525 tbl. 1.97A (indicating that OxyContin accounted for 10% of prescription
pain reliever use and 12% of abuse in 2016). But see Sharon L. Walsh et al., The Relative Abuse
Liability of Oral Oxycodone, Hydrocodone and Hydromorphone Assessed in Prescription Opioid Abusers, 98
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 191, 200 (2008) (“[T]he abuse liability of [oral hydrocodone,
oxycodone and hydromorphone] does not differ substantially from one another . . . .”).
53 Abby Alpert, David Powell & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Supply-Side Drug Policy in the Presence
of Substitutes: Evidence from the Introduction of Abuse-Deterrent Opioids, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y,
Nov. 2018, at 1, 1.
54 See U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMM., FUELING
AN EPIDEMIC: REPORT TWO – EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL TIES BETWEEN OPIOID
MANUFACTURERS AND THIRD PARTY ADVOCACY GROUPS (2018) (noting that payments from
Purdue account for almost half of the $9 million in funding to advocacy groups and professional
societies working on opioid policy, and concluding that this “opioids-friendly messaging . . . may
have played a significant role in creating the necessary conditions for the U.S. opioids epidemic”).
49
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treatments. The FDA has approved three drugs for treating opioid use
disorders—buprenorphine, methadone, and naltrexone—which are available in
various combinations and formulations. 55 Buprenorphine is a partial opioid
agonist, meaning that it partially binds to opioid receptors to reduce cravings
and to reduce the impact of other opioids taken while using the drug.56
The buprenorphine market leader is Indivior, whose buprenorphinenaloxone combination drug Suboxone is, according to some studies, a more
effective opioid substitution treatment than buprenorphine alone or the more
familiar methadone.57 Suboxone was introduced in 2002 as a sublingual (under
the tongue) tablet subject to a seven-year period of exclusivity under the Orphan
Drug Act. 58 The approaching end of Indivior’s exclusivity period brought
another example of product hopping. 59 The company developed and gained
FDA approval for a sublingual film version of Suboxone, with patent protection
extending until 2030. 60 As alleged in an antitrust suit brought by thirty-five
states, Indivior then engaged in a campaign to shift patients from the tablet
version to the film version, thus negating the threat of competition from generic
tablets that could go on the market starting in 2009.61 According to the states’
complaint, Indivior’s campaign took several forms. The company “aggressively”
promoted the superiority of the film version to physicians, pharmacists, and
payors.62 It priced the film version below the tablet version even though the film
version is more expensive to produce.63 And then in 2012, it followed Purdue’s
lead in protesting the safety of its own soon-to-be-generic product to remove it
from the market.64 Indivior announced that it would take the tablet form off the
See Information About Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm600092.htm
(last
updated Feb. 14, 2019).
56 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MEDICATIONS FOR OPIOID USE DISORDER
SAVE LIVES 35–36 (2019).
57 See CANADIAN AGENCY FOR DRUGS & TECHNOLOGIES IN HEALTH, RAPID RESPONSE
REPORT: SUMMARY WITH CRITICAL APPRAISAL—SUBOXONE VERSUS METHADONE FOR THE
TREATMENT OF OPIOID DEPENDENCE: A REVIEW OF THE CLINICAL AND COSTEFFECTIVENESS (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/n/rc0495/pdf.
58 See In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13MD-2445, 2017 WL 3967911, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2017).
59 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
60 See In re Suboxone, 2017 WL 3967911, at *3; Patent and Exclusivity for N022410, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
ORANGE
BOOK,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001&Appl_
No=022410&Appl_type=N (last visited July 21, 2019).
61 See In re Suboxone, 2017 WL 3967911, at *4. The district court has denied defendants’
motion to dismiss, id. at *24, and has certified two classes in the litigation, In re Suboxone
(Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Nalaxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2445, 2019 WL
4735520 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2019).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 For a more detailed analysis of how branded firms use citizen petitions to delay generic
approval, see Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last
Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305 (2016). The FDA has recently announced draft guidance that
55
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market due to a “pediatric exposure safety issue” and petitioned the FDA to deny
approval for generic versions of the Suboxone tablet due to purported safety
concerns.65
Because Indivior believed it would enjoy monopoly power over
Suboxone film but would soon face competition from generic tablets, 66 the
company apparently sought to cannibalize the tablet market and induce demand
for a new product. Indivior’s efforts to transition patients to the patented film
version of Suboxone bore fruit: by 2013, eighty-five percent of prescriptions for
Suboxone were written for the film formulation, 67 and Suboxone has
consistently held over fifty percent of the buprenorphine market.68 But it did not
come cheap—about $8.56 per dose as of early 2019, or slightly more than $500
per month for twice-a-day use. 69 Indivior’s annual revenue from Suboxone
topped $1 billion each year from 2014 to 2018.70
While a lucrative business for Indivior, medication-assisted treatment
continues to be underused in the United States, reaching—by the National
Academies’ estimate—only about twenty percent of patients who are estimated
to need it. 71 Moreover, it is far from clear that Suboxone film carried any
advantage over Suboxone tablets. The FDA has not found Indivior’s claims
regarding the dangers of Suboxone tablets to be supported by evidence,72 and in
2019, Indivior was federally indicted for fraudulently marketing Suboxone film
as safer than the tablet form.73

would give them greater authority to deny these petitions. Citizen Petitions and Petitions for Stay
of Action Subject to Section 505(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Draft
Guidance for Industry; Availability, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,935 (Oct. 3, 2018).
65 In re Suboxone, 2017 WL 3967911, at *4–5.
66 This belief might turn out to be inaccurate. Indivior is now fighting a challenge from rival
Dr. Reddy’s to the patents on the film version of Suboxone. See Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s
Labs., S.A., No. 2018-2167, 2018 WL 6069706 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2018) (vacating a preliminary
injunction against Dr. Reddy’s).
67 In re Suboxone, 2017 WL 3967911, at *5.
68 See Annual Reports, INDIVIOR, http://www.indivior.com/annual-reports (last visited July 21,
2019).
69 See Ari Alstedter, America’s Best Weapon in the Opioid Epidemic Just Got Cheaper, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-20/america-s-bestweapon-in-the-opioid-epidemic-just-got-cheaper.
70 See Annual Reports, supra note 68. Indivior started as the buprenorphine division of Reckitt
Benckiser in 1994 and was spun off into a separate company in 2014. See History, INDIVIOR,
http://www.indivior.com/about/our-history (last visited July 21, 2019).
71 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 56, at 19.
72 In re Suboxone, 2017 WL 3967911, at *5.
73 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Indivior Inc. Indicted for Fraudulently Marketing
Prescription Opioid (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/indivior-inc-indictedfraudulently-marketing-prescription-opioid; Indictment, United States v. Indivior Inc., No. 1:19cr-00016
(W.D.
Va.
Apr.
9,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1153066/download. The district court denied Indivior’s motion to dismiss. United
States v. Indivior Inc., No. 1:19-CR-00016, 2019 WL 6039969 (W.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2019).
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3. The $4100 Overdose Treatment: Why Was the Adoption of
Opioid Inhibitors So Slow?
For patients underserved by addiction treatments, medications to halt
the effects of an overdose are another evidence-supported intervention to reduce
the human costs of the opioid crisis. One such drug is naloxone—the drug
combined with buprenorphine in Suboxone—which binds to opioid receptors
to block the effects of other opioids. It was first approved by the FDA in 1971 to
reverse opioid overdose.74 Naloxone is widely used for this purpose by medical
professionals, but it has been difficult for lay people to use effectively.75
To address this problem, the pharmaceutical company Kaléo developed
an naloxone auto-injector, which was approved by the FDA in 2014.76 Evzio’s
delivery mechanism resembles the much more familiar epinephrine autoinjector EpiPen, and the product has been described as “an EpiPen for
naloxone.” 77 A distinguishing feature of Evzio, however, is that each packet
comes with an audio recording and visual cues that guide users through the
injection process. That—plus the auto-injector format—is reported to give Evzio
a significant ease-of-use advantage over other naloxone delivery mechanisms,
including the nasal spray branded as Narcan.78
Evzio’s approval appears to have been based on relatively little R&D
compared with most new therapeutics. In general, FDA approval of a new drug
requires multiple clinical studies that examine the drug’s effectiveness compared
with a placebo or a different active drug in a large sample of patients who are
observed over many months.79 The direct costs of these trials are typically tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars. 80 But given that naloxone had been used
successfully since the 1970s and that Evzio’s novelty was in the delivery system,
the FDA did not require a new clinical efficacy study. Rather, it granted approval
based simply on (1) demonstrated bioequivalence to existing naloxone products,
(2) prior EpiPen studies showing the safety of auto-injectors, and (3) a human
factors validation study showing that 30 out of 40 participants were able to
74 See Mark A. Merlin, Navin Ariyaprakai & Faizan H Arshad, Assessment of the Safety and Ease
of Use of the Naloxone Auto-Injector for the Reversal of Opioid Overdose, 7 OPEN ACCESS EMERGENCY
MED. 21, 21 (2015).
75 See id. at 22.
76 See id.
77 See, e.g., Episode No. 180: The Ongoing Opiate Crisis, SMART DRUG SMARTS (May 12, 2017),
https://smartdrugsmarts.com/episodes/episode-180-opiates. The EpiPen is a fascinating story
of innovation institutions in itself. See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold Epipen
Story: How Mylan Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017).
78 See, e.g., Merlin et al., supra note 74; infra note 195 and accompanying text.
79 See Thomas J. Moore et al., Estimated Costs of Pivotal Trials for Novel Therapeutic Agents Approved
by the US Food and Drug Administration, 2015–2016, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1451, 1454 tbl.2
(2018) (examining the 59 novel drugs approved by the FDA in 2015 and 2016 and reporting that
the approvals were based on 138 clinical trials, of which over 80% were placebo-controlled, over
94% involved over 100 patients and over 52% involved over 500 patients, and over 35% had a
treatment duration longer than six months).
80 See id. (finding a median estimated direct cost of $19 million).
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adequately deliver naloxone to a dummy using the auto-injector without training
or reading the accompanying package insert.81 Kaléo claims that it “has invested
more than $100 million in the research, development and commercialization”
of Evzio, 82 although a comparison with the firm’s Securities and Exchange
Commission filings suggests that much of this funding was on marketing rather
than R&D.83
Yet in spite of—or rather, because of—Evzio’s relatively quick path to
market, the drug enjoys a lengthy period of patent-protected exclusivity: Kaléo
has declared that its product is protected by thirty-one patents, expiring as late
as 2035.84 (As with OxyContin and Suboxone, this exclusivity period has been
extended through product hopping. 85 ) We say that this lengthy period of
exclusivity is the result of the short R&D process because firms file for patents
early in the process of developing a drug, well before the drug is approved by the
FDA and available to consumers.86 This means that drugs for which the “time
to market” is short enjoy longer periods of market exclusivity than drugs for
which the time to market is long, since long time-to-market drugs “burn” much
of their twenty-year patent life during the R&D phase. 87 The relationship
between time to market and length of exclusivity arguably leads to an upsidedown system of incentives, where the financial rewards for easier-to-develop
drugs are greater than the rewards for drugs that take years to fine-tune and
test.88

81 See Merlin et al., supra note 74. For the FDA analysis, see CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION
& RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATION NUMBER 205787ORIG1S000
SUMMARY
REVIEW
3
(2014),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/205787Orig1s000SumR.pdf. A
subsequent Kaléo study with 42 participants found greater success administering Evzio than an
intranasal delivery system. See Evan T. Edwards, Comparative Usability Study of a Novel Auto-Injector
and an Intranasal System for Naloxone Delivery, 4 PAIN THERAPY 89 (2015).
82 Press Release, Kaléo, Kaléo Announces the Award of Its 100th Patent (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://kaleo.com/press-release/kaleo-announces-the-award-of-its-100th-patent.
83 See Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government Patent Use to Address the Rising Cost of
Naloxone: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and Evzio, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 472, 476 (2018).
84 See Patent and Exclusivity for N209862, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ORANGE BOOK,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/Cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001&Appl_
No=209862&Appl_type=N (last visited July 21, 2019).
85 The original 2014 Evzio was discontinued and replaced with a higher strength version in
2016. For the 2014 version, see Product Details for NDA 205787, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
ORANGE
BOOK,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/Cder/ob/results_product.cfm?Appl_Type=N&Appl_
No=205787 (last visited July 21, 2019).
86 See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV.
503 (2009).
87 See Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term
Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044 (2015) (showing that this
effect leads to more R&D for cancer drugs with longer effective patent life).
88 On the implications for patent policy of time-to-market differentials, see generally
Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV.
672 (2014).
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Evzio debuted in 2014 at a list price of $575 for a two-dose prescription.89
Kaléo subsequently hiked the price per prescription to $750 in 2015, $3750 in
2016, and $4100 in 2017.90 For comparison, the manufacturing cost for an Evzio
unit is $52.91 Fewer than 70,000 Evzio prescriptions were filled in the twelve
months ending in January 2017.92 These high prices have generated complaints
from a number of potential purchasers, including state and local governments.93
B. Intellectual Property Law
OxyContin, Suboxone, and Evzio are all protected by IP law—and in
particular, by lengthy periods of patent exclusivity—so patent law is a logical
culprit in the search for the opioid epidemic’s cause. Indeed, Harvard Medical
School researchers Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael Sinha, and Aaron Kesselheim
have argued that “non-rigorous patenting standards . . . played an important
role in launching and prolonging the opioid epidemic.”94 They focus specifically
on OxyContin and Suboxone, both of which are covered by patents that—they
say—should have been rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on
grounds of obviousness. 95 Kesselheim, writing separately, has also assigned
blame to patent law for limiting access to Evzio and other naloxone delivery
devices.96

89 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. & GOV’TL AFFAIRS, 115TH CONG., COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: THE PRICE
INCREASE OF AN OPIOID OVERDOSE REVERSAL DRUG AND THE COST TO THE U.S. HEALTH
CARE
SYSTEM
32–33
(Comm.
Print
2018),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Naloxone%20Report%20Final%20with%20
Annex1.pdf.
90 Id. at 46. Some sources indicate that the 2017 price was as much as $4,500. See Shefali
Luthra, The $4,500 Injection to Stop Heroin Overdoses, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-4500-injection-to-stop-heroinoverdoses/2017/01/27/becaaca4-dcf6-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html.
91 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89, at 37. The “unit
cost” is $174, including $29 in overhead and $93 in “obsolescence.” Id.
92 Id. at 5.
93 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 77 (“[P]rice increases of the various forms of
naloxone continue to create affordability issues, preventing state and local governments, as well
as community organizations, from stocking naloxone at the levels necessary to rescue more
people from overdose.”); David McFadden, In Opioid Epidemic, Some Cities Strain to Afford OD
Antidote,
U.S.
NEWS
(Apr.
12,
2018),
https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/maryland/articles/2018-04-12/in-opioid-epidemic-some-cities-strain-to-afford-odantidote.
94 Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a
Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464 (2017).
95 See id. at 470–71 (OxyContin); id. at 473 (Suboxone). See also Rebecca L. Haffajee &
Richard G. Frank, Generic Drug Policy and Suboxone to Treat Opioid Use Disorder, J.L. MED. & ETHICS
(forthcoming), https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1073110519898042 (arguing that patent abuse and
related strategies limited generic entry for Suboxone and helped maintain high prices, which
“limited the volume of drugs purchased, particularly through public health insurance and grant
programs”).
96 See Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 83, at 473–77.
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Taken together, these claims about OxyContin, Suboxone, and Evzio
present a puzzle. Sarpatwari, Sinha, and Kesselheim contend that patent
protection led to the proliferation of OxyContin and the undersupply of
Suboxone (and, according to Kesselheim, also the undersupply of Evzio). But
why would patent protection result in more of the first drug and less of the latter
two? The authors never note this tension or seek to resolve it. This Section takes
up that task. We first explain why patent protection plausibly contributed to
OxyContin’s deadly spread. We then explain why patent protection likely led to
undersupply of Suboxone and Evzio. Finally, we consider how these crosscutting claims can be reconciled and what that reconciliation might tell us about
IP’s role in the opioid crisis.
1. IP and OxyContin
The notion that patent law contributed to the proliferation of OxyContin
cuts decidedly against the conventional wisdom about IP. The conventional view
of patent law posits that patent monopolies lead to higher prices and lower
quantities of patented products.97 This is because patentees can maximize profits
by pricing their products well above marginal cost (i.e., the cost of producing an
additional unit), which means that some consumers who would have purchased
the product in a perfectly competitive market choose not to when the price is
marked up.98 In mine-run cases, this reduction in quantity is considered to be a
downside of patent protection,99 but when the product in question is a potentially
harmful drug, the reduction in quantity can increase social welfare. Christopher
Cotropia and James Gibson have called this latter phenomenon “the upside of
intellectual property’s downside”100: the quantity reduction resulting from patent
protection is a feature, not a bug, when the relevant product is a detriment to
society.
Under this view, patent protection for OxyContin should have led to
lower quantities of the drug being produced and sold. But the story of OxyContin
did not play out as one might have expected: the drug became widely accessible
even to consumers of modest means. Why did the trajectory of OxyContin play
out so differently than the conventional view of patent law would suggest?

97 See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 525, 529 (2001).
98 See, e.g., Jen Christensen, The 5 Most Expensive Drugs in the United States, CNN (May 11, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/11/health/most-expensive-prescription-drugs/index.html
(reporting price tags exceeding $40,000 for a one-month supply of some pharmaceuticals); see
generally JAY BHATTACHARYA, TIMOTHY HYDE & PETER TU, HEALTH ECONOMICS 235 (2013)
(“[I]n exchange for [innovation-related] future benefits, costs are imposed on today’s consumers
in the form of higher—and for some people, unaffordable—drug prices”).
99 See Sampat & Williams, supra note 24; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 97, at 529
(“[T]here is a deadweight loss in social welfare because too little is sold at the monopoly price.”).
100 Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57
UCLA L. REV. 921 (2010). For a similar argument in the antitrust context, see Christopher R.
Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizonal Price-Fixing, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 243 (1993).
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We think at least two factors are likely to have played some role in
OxyContin’s proliferation: (a) the incentive IP provides to invest in demand
creation, and (b) the habit-forming nature of the drug for both prescribing
doctors and patients. These effects complicate the conventional understanding
of IP law’s tradeoffs between dynamic and allocative efficiency. We consider
each in turn.
a. Demand Creation
The first mechanism counteracting patents’ quantity-limiting effect is
that patents generate particularly strong incentives to invest in demand creation.
If a firm is one of several purveyors of Honeycrisp apples, then it has a
comparatively weak incentive to promote demand for Honeycrisps because the
benefits of demand creation will spill over to other Honeycrisp purveyors.101 If a
firm is the sole purveyor of a patented product—whether it be a fruit variety102
or a pharmaceutical—then its demand-creation incentives are much stronger,
as it can capture all of the benefits of its promotional efforts. Purdue Pharma
invested enormous resources in creating demand for OxyContin, and while
some of that investment might have occurred in the absence of patent protection,
it is doubtful that the pharmaceutical company’s outlays would have been on the
same scale but for the additional IP impetus.
OxyContin’s selling points were several. First, Purdue sought to tap into
the widespread belief that immediate-release oxycodone was an effective
analgesic. “The importance of the familiarity of physicians with oxycodone
cannot be overstated,” Purdue officials wrote in an internal marketing plan.103
“This familiarity is a principal factor that should lead to acceptance of
OxyContin,” the officials added. 104 Purdue officials also emphasized
OxyContin’s convenience: the controlled-release formulation meant that
patients would have to take the drug only once every twelve hours, as opposed
to four-times-a-day dosing for the more common immediate-release versions of
oxycodone then on the market. “All of our market research indicates that the
most important feature of OxyContin beyond oxycodone is the q12h dosing
schedule,” according to Purdue materials.105 Finally, Purdue highlighted the low
risk of “adverse events” even at high dosage levels.106
Honeycrisp apples, incidentally, were previously patent-protected, but the University of
Minnesota’s plant patent has since expired. See Dan Olson, Honeycrisp Apple Losing Its Patent
Protection,
But
Not
Its
Appeal,
MINN. PUB. RADIO
(Oct.
21,
2007),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2007/10/11/honeycrisp.
102 Cf. Dan Charles, Want to Grow These Apples? You’ll Have to Join the Club, NAT’L PUB. RADIO:
MORNING
EDITION
(Nov.
10,
2014),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/11/10/358530280/want-to-grow-these-applesyoull-have-to-join-the-club (discussing the role of patent and trademark law in protecting the
rights to the SweeTango apple variety).
103 Purdue and the OxyContin Files, supra note 34 (page 21 of 1996 Budget Plan).
104 Id.
105 Id. (page 22 of 1996 Budget Plan).
106 Id. (page 28 of 1996 Budget Plan).
101
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At least with the benefit of hindsight, all of these claims now appear to
be dubious at best. Rigorous evidence for oxycodone’s analgesic efficacy is scant.
One recent randomized controlled trial involving acute pain patients found no
statistically significant difference in pain outcomes between patients who were
administered oxycodone with acetaminophen and patients who were
administered ibuprofen with acetaminophen.107 (Acetaminophen is the generic
name for Tylenol, and ibuprofen is available under brands such as Motrin or
Advil.) Another year-long randomized study of patients with chronic back pain
or with hip or knee osteoarthritis found no significant difference in pain-related
function between patients receiving high doses of opioids (including oxycodone)
and patients receiving non-opioid treatments. 108 Indeed, the non-opioid
treatment group fared significantly better on a self-reported pain scale.109 But of
course, Purdue and other opioid manufacturers had little incentive to develop or
disclose this kind of negative information about their products. 110 Instead,

Andrew K. Chang et al., Effect of a Single Dose of Oral Opioid and Nonopioid Analgesics on Acute
Extremity Pain in the Emergency Department, 318 JAMA 1661 (2017). While the Chang et al. study
did not administer controlled-release oxycodone, Purdue’s marketing efforts did not claim that
controlled-release oxycodone was more effective than its immediate-release counterpart. Rather,
Purdue’s claim was that controlled-release oxycodone was more convenient than its immediaterelease counterpart. See Purdue and the OxyContin Files, supra note 34 (noting on page 20 of Purdue’s
1996 OxyContin budget plan that OxyContin had “[a]ll the analgesic efficacy of immediaterelease oxycodone” with “the ease of [twelve-hour] dosing”).
It is worth noting that the oxycodone-plus-acetaminophen treatment group in the Chang et
al. study received relatively small doses of both drugs (5 milligrams of oxycodone and 325
milligrams of acetaminophen), while the ibuprofen-plus-acetaminophen treatment group
received much larger doses (400 milligrams of ibuprofen and 1000 milligrams of
acetaminophen). Chang, supra; see also Josh Bloom, Advil Works as Well as Opioids for Acute Pain? Not
So
Fast,
AM.
COUNCIL
ON
SCI.
&
HEALTH
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.acsh.org/news/2017/11/07/advil-works-well-opioids-acute-pain-not-so-fast12089 (post on website of industry-funded group noting low oxycodone dosage in the Chang et
al. study). Our main point here is not that there is evidence of the absence of oxycodone’s
efficacy, but that there is an absence of evidence of oxycodone’s efficacy.
108 Erin E. Krebs et al., Effect of Opioid vs Nonopioid Medications on Pain-Related Function in Patients
with Chronic Back Pain or Hip or Knee Osteoarthritis Pain: The SPACE Randomized Clinical Trial, 319
JAMA 872 (2018).
109 Id. at 877 tbl.2. Dosages in the Krebs et al. study were significantly higher than in Chang
et al., supra note 107. The highest dosage of oxycodone was 100 morphine-equivalent milligrams
per day, or 67 milligrams of oxycodone. See Krebs et al., supra note 108, at 874. Cf. Calculating
Total Daily Dose of Opioids for Safer Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/calculating_total_daily_dose-a.pdf (last visited Mar.
3, 2019) (conversion factor of 1.5 morphine-equivalent milligrams for oxycodone).
110 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007) (“Pharmaceutical firms sell drugs rather than selling
information as such, and they face powerful incentives to cheat in developing and selectively
disclosing information about their products in order to improve sales.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg
& W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES
3, 18 (2017) (noting drug manufacturers’ incentives to not conduct comparative effectiveness
research); Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 23, at 1923–27 (describing the lack of incentive to
produce negative information about pharmaceuticals).
107
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Purdue promoted OxyContin as a way for patients to “gain control of [their]
pain” after over-the-counter analgesics had failed.111
As for the twelve-hour dosing advantage, this too now appears to have
been illusory. A study by researchers at Oklahoma University College of
Medicine published in 2002 found that almost nine in ten patients prescribed
OxyContin ended up taking the drug more frequently than twice a day.
“[N]early every patient in the analysis reported perceived end-of-dose failure of
analgesia as the reason for taking the medicine more frequently,” the researchers
wrote.112 A Los Angeles Times exposé collected stories from physicians and patients
across the country attesting to “OxyContin’s 12-hour problem.” When the drug
wears off before the twelve-hour mark—as it often does—“patients can
experience excruciating symptoms of withdrawal, including an intense craving
for the drug,” the Times reported.113 The high highs and low lows associated with
twelve-hour dosing “could be ‘the perfect recipe for addiction,’” the Times
quoted a leading brain researcher as saying.114
All the while, Purdue sought to persuade physicians and patients that
addiction concerns were overblown. In that effort, Purdue relied heavily on a
one-paragraph letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1980—
not a peer-reviewed study—which noted that among nearly 12,000 patients who
had received at least one narcotic painkiller, “there were only four cases of
reasonably well documented addiction in patients who had no history of
addiction.”115 This letter was then heavily and uncritically cited as evidence that
opioid addiction is rare, with later writers describing it as an “extensive study”
or a “landmark report.” 116 By 2001, public health advocates were raising
concerns about OxyContin’s addiction risk and petitioning the FDA to recall the
drug, and in July 2001, the FDA worked with Purdue to add stronger warnings
about the potential for abuse to the OxyContin label.117 But even then, Purdue
argued that the warning was “more of an exercise in graphic design” and that

See Purdue and the OxyContin Files, supra note 34.
112 D. Adams et al., Retrospective Assessment of Frequency of Dosing of Sustained Release Opiate
Preparations in Chronic Pain Patients, 3 PAIN MED. 185, 185 (2002).
113 Harriet Ryan, Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’ OxyContin’s 12Hour Problem, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1.
114 Id. (quoting Theodore J. Cicero, professor of neuropharmacology and neurobiology at the
Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis).
115 Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Correspondence, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics,
302 N. ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980).
116 See Sarah Zhang, The One-Paragraph Letter from 1980 that Fueled the Opioid Crisis, ATLANTIC
(June
2,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/06/nejm-letteropioids/528840 (citing Pamela T.M. Leung et al., A 1980 Letter on the Risk of Opioid Addiction, 376
N. ENG. J. MED. 2194 (2017)); see also Van Zee, supra note 14, at 223 (explaining how Purdue
misrepresented the risk of addiction for OxyContin).
117 See BETH MACY, DOPESICK 50–51 (2018); Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant
Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, supra note 38.
111
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the real victims were “legitimate patients” who would lose access to pain relief if
OxyContin were restricted.118 OxyContin sales continued to climb.119
What made Purdue’s demand-creation strategy remarkable—and
remarkably successful—was not just the audacity of its claims but the intensity
of its efforts. From 1996 to 2001, Purdue held over forty all-expenses-paid
conferences in Florida, Arizona, and California for over 5000 physicians,
pharmacists, and nurses.120 It distributed more than 14,000 videos claiming that
less than one percent of patients who took opioids would become addicted (a
figure that—while dubious—is also less impressive than it sounds once one
considers that one percent of a third of U.S. adults would still add up to nearly a
million individuals suffering from substance abuse disorder).121 In 2001 alone,
Purdue’s marketing expenses came to approximately $200 million, including $40
million in incentive bonuses for sales representatives.122 This kind of direct-tophysician marketing of prescription opioids has been linked to increased
prescription rates and opioid-related overdoses.123
In the absence of patent protection, would Purdue Pharma have had as
strong an incentive to invest in creating demand for controlled-release
oxycodone? Likely not. Purdue knew that if it persuaded physicians to prescribe
controlled-release oxycodone to patients, then Purdue would capture the vast
majority of resulting revenues. If it were easy for competitors to sell generic
versions of OxyContin, however, then Purdue Pharma would have been less
likely to invest so heavily in marketing efforts that would have largely benefitted
its rivals.
The example of Pfizer’s drug Viagra is illustrative. Advertisements for
Viagra, marketed as a treatment for erectile dysfunction, once dominated the
airwaves, with celebrities such as former U.S. Senator Bob Dole and Brazilian
football legend Pelé among the drug’s promoters.124 Once a generic version of
MACY, supra note 117, at 51 (quoting a Purdue spokesman).
See Ryan et al., supra note 113 (graphing OxyContin sales from 1996 to 2014). We are
unsure why profits declined from 2003 to 2006 before skyrocketing again; perhaps it relates to
the FDA warning letter sent to Purdue Pharma in 2003 for misleading advertisements. See
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, supra note
38.
120 Van Zee, supra note 14, at 221; see also MACY, supra note 117, ch. 2 (detailing OxyContin
marketing activities).
121 Fred Schulte, How America Got Hooked on a Deadly Drug, NBC NEWS (June 14, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/how-america-got-hooked-deadly-drugn883361.
122 Van Zee, supra note 14, at 221–22.
123 Scott E. Hadland et al., Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid Products to
Physicians with Subsequent Opioid Prescribing, 6 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 861 (2018). Interestingly,
advertising also played a role in America’s first opioid epidemic in the late nineteenth century.
See Jon Kelvy, How Advertising Shaped the First Opioid Epidemic, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/how-advertising-shaped-first-opioidepidemic-180968444.
124 See Megan Garber, Jagged Little (Blue) Pill, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/03/20-years-of-viagra/556343.
118
119
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the drug became available in 2017, Pfizer’s spending on Viagra ads sharply
plummeted. 125 And Viagra is an especially noticeable example of what is a
broader trend: IP-protected exclusivity and marketing expenditures are closely
tied. Systematic empirical studies of the pharmaceutical market have found that
on average, marketing expenditures decline after patent expiration, and that the
resulting negative effect on consumption is equal to or even greater than the
positive effect from increased competition and decreased price.126
The relationship between patent protection and demand creation points
to one way in which “the upside of intellectual property’s downside” may not be
an upside after all. By that, we mean that patent protection for socially harmful
products will not necessarily reduce the quantity consumed. This also means that
when the relevant product generates positive externalities, the perceived downside
of intellectual property in terms of allocative inefficiency may not be as much of
a downside as traditional models suggest. That is, patent protection for positive
externality-generating goods may encourage greater investment in demand
creation—and ultimately, higher consumption—than if the same good had been
unpatented. The overall welfare effect of the patent system will thus depend
importantly on whether the system successfully distinguishes between—and
offers differential rewards to—socially beneficial and socially harmful
products.127
See Anthony Crupi, Deflategate 2.0: Big-Spending Viagra and Cialis Are Pulling out of the NFL,
ADAGE (July 7, 2017), https://adage.com/article/special-report-tv-upfront/erectiledysfunction-viagra-cialis-NFL-pullout/309692.
126 See Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An
Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151, 151 (2012) (“[I]n the short run, patent
expirations reduce output and consumer welfare by decreasing marketing. In the long run,
patent expirations benefit consumers, but by 30 percent less than would be implied by the
reduction in price alone.”); Gautier Duflos & Frank R. Lichtenberg, Does Competition Stimulate Drug
Utilization? The Impact of Changes in Market Structure on US Drug Prices, Marketing and Utilization, 32
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 95, 95 (2012) (“Price and marketing expenditure both decline by about
50–60% in the years immediately following generic entry, but the number of prescriptions
remains essentially constant during those years.”).
Of course, the full story of pharmaceutical marketing cannot be reduced to a simple narrative
of high marketing expenditures during the patent term and low marketing expenditures
thereafter. Firms often (and sometimes with success) seek to transition consumers to new versions
of a drug with longer patent protection through product hopping, as Purdue did with its 2010
reformulation of OxyContin. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. They may also launch
low-price versions of their products to compete with generics while raising prices on the original
drug to retain the most brand-loyal consumers. See Dipak C. Jain & James G. Conley, Patent
Expiry and Pharmaceutical Market Opportunities at the Nexus of Pricing and Innovation Policy, in
INNOVATION AND MARKETING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 255 (Min Ding et al. eds.
2014). The key point is that the incentives patents provide for promotion and marketing can
offset their quantity-limiting effect. Simple models based on patent law’s tradeoff between
allocative and dynamic efficiency fail to capture this important element of innovation institutions.
127 The net effect of patent law’s incentives for demand creation will also inform proposals to
enhance this commercialization incentive. See generally Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of
Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007) (proposing patent extension
auctions to incentivize commercialization); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 341 (2010) (discussing the role patents play in commercialization and proposing a new
“commercialization” patent to further this goal).
125
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b. Habit Formation
The prospect of market exclusivity interacted with OxyContin’s
addictive properties to generate especially strong incentives for the dissemination
of OxyContin. The risk of addiction may have altered Purdue Pharma’s profitmaximization calculus, causing the company to adopt a pricing strategy that
initially aimed at encouraging widespread consumption.
If more people consume an addictive good in the present, then future
demand for the good will be higher. As economists have recognized, a rational
firm with market power may thus choose to lower the present price of its good
to increase future demand. 128 If, for example, a tobacco company controls a
significant share of the cigarette market, then the company is likely to profit from
an additional smoker. If, by contrast, the company is one among a large number
of players in a competitive cigarette market, then the likely benefit to the
company of addicting an additional individual is smaller. Just as patent
protection encourages firms to invest more heavily in marketing, it also may
encourage manufacturers of addictive products to price more aggressively early
in the patent term in order to hook new customers.
Importantly, “addiction” in this context refers to any mechanism
through which consumption at one time generates demand at a later time. A
drug may be addictive in this sense if patients develop a compulsion to continue
using it (as in the case of substance use disorder) or if physicians can become
habituated into prescribing it. 129 Studies of physicians’ prescription practices
show wide variation across doctors in the frequency of opioid prescriptions and
the quantity of opioids prescribed—variation that does not appear to be a
function of patient characteristics. 130 As the author of one of these studies
hypothesizes, physicians may emulate their mentors’ prescription practices to a
large extent—in which case one physician’s prescription behavior at one time
may influence many more physicians’ behaviors at later points in time. 131 If
128 On the interaction between market power and addiction, see generally Robert Driskill &
Stephen McCafferty, Monopoly and Oligopoly Provision of Addictive Goods, 42 INT’L ECON. REV. 43
(2001) (modeling “monopoly and oligopoly provision of an addictive good” and finding “a wide
variety of possible steady-state outcomes, including ones with output above the efficient level and
price below marginal cost”); Timothy J. Richards et al., Fast Food, Addiction, and Market Power, 32
J. AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECON. 425 (2007) (“[A] firm with market power will price
below marginal cost in a steady-state equilibrium . . . .”); and Mark H. Showalter, Firm Behavior
in a Market with Addiction: The Case of Cigarettes, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 409 (1999).
129 See Sebastian Potthoff et al., Planning to Be Routine: Habit as a Mediator of the Planning-Behaviour
Relationship in Healthcare Professionals, 12 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 24 (2017) (“Healthcare
professionals often perform the same clinical behaviours repeatedly until they become routine
practice, and once a behaviour has become routine, it is increasingly controlled by habit rather
than solely by conscious, in the moment decision-making.”).
130 See Michael L. Barnett, Andrew R. Olenski & Anupam B. Jena, Opioid-Prescribing Patterns
of Emergency Physicians and Risk of Long-Term Use, 376 N. ENG. J. MED. 663, 667-71 (2017); Maureen
V. Hill, Wide Variation and Excessive Dosage of Opioid Prescription for Common General Surgical Procedures,
265 ANNALS OF SURGERY 709 (2017).
131 See Julia Belluz, Certain Doctors Are More Likely to Create Opioid Addicts. Understanding Why Is Key
to Solving the Crisis, VOX (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
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prescription behavior is propagated in this way, then firms with long-term
market power over a drug have an even stronger incentive to boost presentperiod consumption.
In the case of OxyContin, Purdue’s pricing of the drug more or less
conformed to what we might expect from a firm with market power over an
addictive product. From 2000 to 2015, the (licit) retail price per tablet of 10miligram strength OxyContin increased by nearly sixty percent after adjusting
for inflation, while the inflation-adjusted price of an 80-milligram tablet
increased by more than eighty percent.132 But for Purdue’s bankruptcy filing in
2019 and a tentative settlement with city and state governments,133 we might
have expected a continuing pattern of price increases as the firm’s patent
exclusivity with respect to OxyContin neared its end. (The tentative settlement
restricts Purdue’s marketing and sale of OxyContin, which may impede further
profit maximization efforts—although there is evidence that the Sackler family’s
international affiliate is using similar tactics to promote OxyContin abroad.134)
Purdue’s incentive to generate widespread demand for a highly addictive
product can help explain why patents may not have had their conventional
quantity-limiting effect in the case of OxyContin. We do not mean to suggest,
however, that denying IP protection to OxyContin would have prevented the
opioid crisis. As noted above, OxyContin constitutes just a small portion of the
prescription opioid market. More importantly, it is difficult to know how the
market would have evolved in the counterfactual in which Purdue did not have
exclusivity with respect to controlled-release oxycodone. Based on the more
systematic economic studies discussed above, it seems clear enough that Purdue
would have invested far less in pushing the narratives that opioids are safe and
effective treatments for chronic pain. But Purdue is not the only opioid producer
that has pushed doctors to increase prescription rates in ways that crossed legal
and ethical boundaries, 135 and it is plausible that had controlled-release
oxycodone been available generically, even more people would have died.

health/2017/2/16/14622198/doctors-prescribe-opioids-varies-patients-hooked (interviewing
Harvard Medical School professor Anupam Jena).
132 See OxyContin Diversion and Abuse, supra note 40; Complaint at 16 ¶ 58, Commonwealth v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-cv-01808 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018),
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/06/12/Purdue%20Complaint%20FILED.pdf;
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1.00&year1=200012&year2=201512 (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
133 See Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for
Bankruptcy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/purdue-pharma-bankruptcy-opioidssettlement.html.
134 See Erika Kinetz, AP Key Findings About Mundipharma’s OxyContin Sales in China, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 19, 2019), https://apnews.com/a9b1324e5b7d4679b5a6d465cea2dd2e.
135 See, e.g., Jonathan Saltzman, Former Drug Exec Pleads Guilty to Pushing Painkiller Prescriptions,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Nov.
28,
2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/11/28/former-drug-exec-pleads-guiltypushing-painkiller-prescriptions/qjxlwlvfKy3o6sNuVvoHwJ/story.html (describing incentives
doctors received from Insys Therapeutics to prescribe a fentanyl-based painkiller).
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To be clear: None of this is to exonerate Purdue for its role in
propagating a false narrative around opioids. Nor is it to exonerate IP law for its
role in the opioid epidemic. But as we discuss below, IP’s contribution to the
crisis—while potentially profound—is also nuanced. OxyContin turns out to
play a small part in a much more complicated narrative.
2. IP, Suboxone, and Evzio
The effect of IP law on the availability of our other two illustrative
drugs—Suboxone and Evzio—looks on first glance like the more traditional tale
of IP leading to high prices and restricted quantities. But again, first impressions
can deceive, and the overall effect of IP on the use of opioid substitutes and
antidotes turns out to be less obvious.
Again, the conventional wisdom is that IP law—whatever its dynamicefficiency effects—leads IP rightsholders to raise prices and thereby reduce
quantities of IP-protected products. Consistent with this conventional story,
Sarpatwari et al. blame patent law for Suboxone’s high price and attribute the
underutilization of Suboxone to that patent-induced pricing problem.136 And as
noted above, Evzio cost $4100 per two-dose prescription by 2017—nearly eighty
times the unit manufacturing cost—leading to similar arguments that patents
limited access.137
If Suboxone and Evzio had not received lengthy IP protection, it is
possible these products would have been developed anyway, and that generic
competitors would have entered the markets for buprenorphine-naloxone
addiction treatments and for naloxone auto-injector overdose treatments,
decreasing prices and increasing the number of patients with access to these
products. On this account, Indivior and Kaléo could be portrayed as villains in
the opioid story, using unnecessary patents, product hopping, and high prices to
deprive patients of access to lifesaving medical treatments. But it is not obvious
that long-lasting patent protection can be blamed for limiting access to Suboxone
and Evzio. The two factors behind OxyContin’s proliferation—IP-driven
demand creation and habit formation—are present to at least some degree for
Suboxone and Evzio as well. It is possible that without Indivior’s and Kaléo’s
high-powered IP incentives to develop and promote demand for their
products—including to encourage early use by consumers who would then be
more likely to make repeat purchases—fewer patients would be using these
products today.
First, although Indivior and Kaléo did not spend as extravagantly on
marketing as Purdue did, their long-lasting IP protection would seem to provide
a similar incentive to increase demand for their products. ProPublica reports that
Indivior has spent about $4 million on payments to physicians and lobbying since

136
137

Sarpatwari et al., supra note 94, at 475.
See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
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2013,138 and the company’s annual reports describe its efforts to overcome the
stigma of medical treatment for addiction. 139 Meanwhile, Kaléo’s financial
statements suggest that it was pouring all its revenues and then some into
expanding sales, 140 including through nearly $2.4 million in Evzio-related
payments to physicians and lobbying since 2013.141 Although these payments
pale next to ProPublica’s estimate of almost $19 million for OxyContin-related
payments by Purdue,142 they signal at least some effort at demand creation.
Second, even if Suboxone and Evzio do not carry the same risk of
medical addiction as OxyContin, demand does seem likely to be linked across
time such that consumption today increases demand tomorrow. Suboxone is
typically used for long-term maintenance therapy for opioid use disorder, with
discontinuation linked to high rates of relapse.143 Patients who begin Suboxone
treatment are thus very likely to become repeat customers, even in the face of
future price increases. And while naloxone has no risk of medical addiction,
Evzio purchasers—including first responders, drug treatment centers, and
businesses in neighborhoods where overdose is common—may become
habituated to Evzio’s ease of use. Commentators have noted that Kaléo has
distributed over 180,000 free devices, apparently with the hope that some of

138
See
Dollars
for
Docs:
Suboxone
Sublingual
Film,
PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/products/drug-suboxone-sublingual-film
(last
visited July 21, 2019); Lobbying Arrangements Results for 'Indivior,' PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/represent/lobbying/search?search=indivior (last visited July
21, 2019). Indivior was spun off from Reckitt Benckiser in 2014. See supra note 70.
139 See, e.g., INDIVIOR, ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2014, at 4 (2014),
http://www.indivior.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/INDIVIOR_Annual_Report_2014.pdf. Demand-creation efforts
focused on addiction treatments are not necessarily beneficial. In December 2019, the FDA
criticized the pharmaceutical firm Alkermes for “misbranding” the opioid addiction drug
Vivitrol by failing to communicate the overdose risks associated with the drug. See Lev Facher,
FDA Blasts Alkermes for Underselling the Risks of Opioid Addiction Drug Vivitrol, STAT (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/12/11/fda-blasts-alkermes-vivitrol-branding.
140 See Kaleo, Inc. and Subsidiary: Consolidated Financial Statements for the Years Ended
December
31,
2016,
2015,
2014,
at
5,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/850429/000085042917000018/kaleofinancialstat
ements.htm.
141
See
Dollars
for
Docs:
Evzio,
PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/products/drug-evzio (last visited July 21, 2019);
Lobbying
Arrangements
Results
for
‘Kaleo,’
PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/represent/lobbying/search?search=kaleo (last visited July 21,
2019).
142
See
Dollars
for
Docs:
OxyContin,
PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/products/drug-oxycontin (last visited July 21,
2019);
Lobbying
Arrangements
Results
for
‘Purdue,’
PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/represent/lobbying/search?search=purdue+pharma
(last
visited July 21, 2019).
143 See CANADIAN AGENCY FOR DRUGS & TECHNOLOGIES IN HEALTH, supra note 57, at 9;
Brandon S. Bentzley et al., Discontinuation of Buprenorphine Maintenance Therapy: Perspectives and
Outcomes, 52 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 48 (2015).
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these recipients would later become paying purchasers of the product.144 And
physicians may become routinized into prescribing Evzio as instructed by
Kaléo’s substantial sales force.
It seems plausible that the markets for both Evzio and Suboxone were
expanded by campaigns aimed at familiarizing doctors and patients with these
products. The naloxone auto-injector was a novel approach to treating
overdoses, so people who could benefit from Evzio—including first responders,
people with opioid use disorder, friends and family members of those at risk of
overdose, and those stocking first aid kits—did not know this was a product they
needed. Suboxone faced a different hurdle. A 2019 National Academies report
concludes that stigma toward opioid agonists like buprenorphine is a barrier to
effective treatment “grounded in the misperception that these medications are
substituting one drug for another,” but that there is some evidence that “as
clinicians gain experience treating patients with [opioid use disorder] with
buprenorphine, they gain more positive perceptions about the role of
medications in effective treatment.” 145 As the sole provider of the leading
buprenorphine product, Indivior arguably had stronger incentives to educate
clinicians and patients than it would have had in a market with generic
competitors who could capture many of the benefits of these promotional efforts.
3. Taking Stock
What, then, can the stories of OxyContin, Suboxone, and Evzio tell us
about the role of IP in the opioid crisis? It might seem that the answer is “not
much”: IP’s effects on quantity are ambiguous, making it difficult to attribute the
spread of OxyContin or the scarcity of Suboxone and Evzio to patent protection
or any other form of IP exclusivity. On further reflection, a few important lessons
emerge.
First, IP relies on markets, and so market failures are likely to result in IP
failures too. Perhaps most obviously, OxyContin generates negative externalities
(including, among others, the externality to family members and neighbors who
are at increased risk of addiction when OxyContin appears in ever more
medicine cabinets146), and Suboxone and Evzio produce positive externalities
(including the externality to individuals other than the prescription holder who
may nonetheless be saved from overdose by a naloxone injection).147 Markets
tend to spawn socially supraoptimal quantities of products that yield negative
Shefali Luthra, Getting Patients Hooked on an Opioid Overdose Antidote, Then Raising the Price,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://khn.org/news/getting-patients-hooked-on-anopioid-overdose-antidote-then-raising-the-price.
145 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 56, at 112.
146 Nazleen F. Khan et al., Association of Opioid Overdose with Opioid Prescriptions to Family Members,
179
JAMA
INTERNAL
MED.
(forthcoming
2019),
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2019.1064.
147 Suboxone (buprenorphine), like OxyContin (oxycodone), can be diverted and abused, but
“buprenorphine and buprenorphine/naloxone generally ranked as the least-abused or misused
opioid among those studied.” Michael A. Yokell et al., Buprenorphine and Buprenorphine/Naloxone
Diversion, Misuse, and Illicit Use: An International Review, 2011 CURRENT DRUG ABUSE REV. 28.
144
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externalities and suboptimal quantities of products that create positive
externalities. It is in some ways unsurprising that America—reliant as it was on
IP, a market institution, to allocate access—ended up with too much OxyContin
and not enough Suboxone and Evzio.
Second, and precisely because IP’s effects on quantity are ambiguous, IP
is too blunt a tool on its own to produce socially optimal quantities of externalitygenerating goods. Sarpatwari, Sinha, and Kesselheim suggest that without
patent protection for OxyContin and Suboxone, we would have ended up with
less of the former and more of the latter.148 But while those counterfactual claims
are plausible, it is also plausible that in a world without patent protection for
OxyContin and Suboxone, we could have ended up with more of the former
(because of lower prices) and less of the latter (because of lower investment in
demand creation). Dialing IP protection down or up will have difficult-to-predict
effects on welfare.
Finally, and relatedly, reliance on market institutions to allocate access
to externality-generating goods will lead to predictable pathologies unless
policymakers use other tools—including ex ante regulation, ex post liability, and
supply- and demand-side subsidies—to correct for market failures. In the
remainder of this Part, we consider how those tools were used and whether they
succeeded.
C. Regulation and Liability
Institutions that regulate new knowledge goods—either in controlling
whether and how the goods make it to market ex ante or in penalizing firms
whose marketed goods turn out to be harmful ex post—play a key role in
mediating IP’s effect on welfare. Here, we consider some of these institutions and
how they interacted with IP throughout the opioid crisis.
1. Ex Ante Limits: The FDA and DEA
The FDA plays an important role in setting the IP incentives discussed
in the prior Section because FDA approval is typically accompanied by a period
of regulatory exclusivity. 149 But the FDA also plays a direct role in drug
regulation by deciding whether and under what conditions a new drug can reach
the market. This regulatory power could be used to cause firms to internalize
negative externalities of their products. For example, a 2017 National Academies
report on pain management argues that the FDA should incorporate public

See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 94, at 464, 470–71, 473.
For example, new small-molecule drugs and biologics receive five and twelve years of data
exclusivity, respectively, before the FDA will approve a generic version, and orphan drugs
receive seven years of market exclusivity. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), 355(j)(5)(F)(ii), 360cc; 42
U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A).
148
149
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health considerations into regulatory decisions, including drug approval and
monitoring.150
But even if the FDA aggressively took this social-welfare-based approach
to drug approvals, it is not obvious that it would have reached a different
outcome. The opioid crisis has had tremendous social cost, but so does chronic
pain. Equally problematically, while the costs of opioids are now reasonably
apparent, it would have been more difficult for the FDA to assess these costs
prior to the height of the epidemic. Controlling the drug supply ex ante is a blunt
policy tool that is difficult to wield.
While the FDA does not currently consider broader public health
considerations when deciding whether to approve new drugs, it has used its
regulatory authority to address direct safety concerns with opioids. Since 2007,
the FDA has had authority to impose a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
(REMS) requirement on drugs with serious associated risks,151 though systematic
studies have been unable to determine whether REMS affect prescribing and
dispensing practices.152 The agency also has encouraged opioid manufacturers
to develop “abuse-deterrent” versions of their products, and it has provided an
abuse-deterrent designation for numerous brand-name opioids, starting with
Purdue’s OxyContin reformulation in 2010.153 But this supply-side intervention
may have backfired, at least in the short term: a recent economic study of crossstate variation in OxyContin exposure suggests that the reformulation in
OxyContin—by cutting access to an easy source of highs—has accelerated the
turn toward heroin as an alternative. 154 Of course, had the FDA required a
tamper-resistant formulation from the outset, it would have avoided this
problem—but that would have required the FDA to foresee OxyContin’s abuse
potential.
Finally, we note that the FDA is not the only drug regulator. For
example, another federal agency that plays an important role in ex ante drug
regulation is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) within the Justice
Department. Prescribing or dispensing buprenorphine (one of the active
ingredients in Suboxone) requires a DEA waiver—a hurdle that is not required
to prescribe OxyContin. Although this rule was motivated by a desire to prevent
further abuse, it likely had the opposite effect. The 2017 report from the
President’s opioid commission recommended that all addiction patients have
access to medication-assisted treatment including buprenorphine but noted that
forty-seven percent of counties nationwide and seventy-two percent of the most
rural counties did not have a physician who had received the required DEA
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID
EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION
OPIOID USE 410–14 (2017); see also Patricia J. Zettler, Margaret Foster Riley & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
221 (2017) (same).
151 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)(E).
152 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 150, at 366.
153 See Alpert et al., supra note 53, at 5–6.
154 Id.
150
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waiver to prescribe this drug.155 In other words, the DEA may have done more
to restrict access to drugs that treat addiction than to drugs that cause it.
2. Ex Post Penalties: Tort and Criminal Liability
Separate legal institutions for ex post drug regulation are the tort and
criminal law system. A sprawling web of complex litigation is currently playing
an important role in forcing Purdue and other opioid manufacturers to
internalize some of the social costs of their products.156 Purdue pled guilty to
felony misbranding in 2007,157 and in March 2019 it agreed to pay $270 million
to settle claims brought by the state of Oklahoma.158 In September 2019, it filed
for bankruptcy and agreed to cede all of its assets to a public benefit trust.159 The
bankruptcy case is ongoing as of this writing, but certainly no one would predict
that Purdue will emerge from the experience unscathed. The Sackler family that
founded and controlled Purdue has pledged to pay $3 billion from their own
fortune as part of a global settlement (though it is not clear whether that aspect
of the deal will hold).160
Why didn’t the threat of tort liability deter opioid manufacturers from
aggressively hawking their wares? For one thing, we cannot say for sure that the
ex ante effect of the threat of ex post liability was null. It may be (though it seems
unlikely) that executives of Purdue and other pharmaceutical companies would
have been even more unabashed in puffing up their products’ virtues and
concealing their vices if tort law had been off the table. We can, however, surmise
several reasons why the shadow of ex post liability was short.
The first set of reasons is internal to tort law. The framework of
negligence liability—centering on the elements of duty, breach, causation, and
damages—provides an awkward fit for claims against opioid manufacturers. It
CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 34, 68.
For a primer, see Abbe R. Gluck, Ashley Hall & Gregory Curfman, Civil Litigation and the
Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351 (2018).
For a more recent update, see Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (and Massively Complex) Opioid
Litigation,
NPR
(Oct.
15,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/10/15/761537367/your-guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioidlitigation.
157 See Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely Abused,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioidsoxycontin.html
158 See Jef Feeley, Purdue Pharma Reaches Deal to Settle Oklahoma Opioid Case, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
25, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-26/purdue-pharma-said-toreach-deal-to-settle-oklahoma-opioid-case.
159 See Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 133.
160 See Jan Hoffman, Purdue Pharma Warns That Sackler Family May Walk from Opioid Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/health/purdue-sackleropioid-settlement.html. The bankruptcy judge put lawsuits against Purdue and the Sacklers on
hold until April 2020 to give the parties more time to reach a settlement. See Tom Hals & Mike
Spector, Where the Purdue Pharma-Sackler Legal Saga Stands, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-purdue-pharma-bankruptcy-factbox/where-the-purduepharma-sackler-legal-saga-stands-idUSKBN1ZS1H3.
155
156
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was far from obvious that, for example, Purdue owed any duty to individuals
who stole OxyContin from family members’ medicine cabinets, crushed tablets
to destroy the controlled-release feature, and then snorted or injected
oxycodone. The fact that the FDA approved OxyContin and other prescription
opioids would have made breach difficult to establish in court, and even if breach
were shown, drawing a causal connection between a manufacturer’s distribution
of opioids and any given individual’s overdose would require a fair amount of
legal creativity. 161 As for damages, apportionment among manufacturers
presents a factual and conceptual challenge. As a court in Connecticut said when
dismissing a suit by the city of New Haven against Purdue, attempting to assign
liability to a particular pharmaceutical company for a share of opioid crisis costs
“would inevitably require determining causation by conjecture.”162 It would be,
according to the court, “junk justice.”163
The Connecticut court’s claim of “junk justice” is certainly contestable.
“Junk justice,” one might fairly respond, is a tort system that allows opioid
manufacturers to flood the country with addictive pills, conceal their risks, and
escape scot-free. But supporters of the effort to hold opioid manufacturers
accountable through tort law forthrightly acknowledged that the battle they were
fighting was uphill.164 The apparent settlement of claims against Purdue may be
a victory on one front of that fight, but it is not an outcome that was clearly
predictable ex ante.
A second set of limits on the power of ex post tort liability is external to
tort law. The limited-liability structure of the corporation shields shareholders
from the financial consequences of corporate wrongdoing. The corporation can
always declare bankruptcy—an option that, as noted, Purdue has pursued—and
it is difficult (though perhaps not impossible) for plaintiffs to claw back from
shareholders the dividends that a corporation paid in solvent times. The Sacklers
161 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Keith Humphreys, The Political Economy of the Opioid
Epidemic, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming) (noting that unlike cigarettes, which “were never
reviewed and sanctioned for sale in advance by the federal government . . . . every
pharmaceutical opioid on the market was approved by the [FDA]” and “when prescribed
judiciously can dramatically relieve human suffering”).
162 City of New Haven v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 2019 Conn. Super. LEXIS 55, at *5 (Jan. 8,
2019).
163 Id.
164 See Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116
W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1165 (2014) (advocating for the pursuit of civil remedies but acknowledging
that “the overall effectiveness of civil litigation in this area is highly questionable”); Cuéllar &
Humphreys, supra note 161 (describing the “host of constraints” facing tort law as a tool for
addressing the opioid crisis); Nora Freeman Engstrom & Michelle M. Mello, Litigation is Critical
to
Opioid
Crisis
Response,
DAILY
JOURNAL
(Mar.
13,
2019),
https://www.dailyjournal.com/articles/351533-litigation-is-critical-to-opioid-crisis-response
(arguing that “litigation is a critically important component of the response to the opioid crisis”
but acknowledging that “the plaintiffs’ path forward is studded with obstacles”); Amanda
Pustilnik, The Law’s Responses to the Opioid Epidemic: Legal Solutions to a Unique Public Health, Criminal
law, and Market-Related Crisis, in CONFRONTING OUR NATION’S OPIOID CRISIS: A REPORT OF
THE ASPEN HEALTH STRATEGY GROUP 93, 110 (Alan R. Weil & Rachel Dolan eds., 2017)
(noting that “the litigation approach as currently practiced has limited deterrent value” and
arguing that manufacturers must somehow be forced to internalize future harms).
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may prove to be the rare case of successful corporate veil-piercing, but they stand
out as an anomaly against the background of limited shareholder liability in
American law.165
Criminal law, meanwhile, may have a role to play in policing the most
egregious abuses, but it is a small role in the overall scheme of the crisis.
Obstacles to the use of serious criminal sanctions may be partly political—
indeed, it was an intervention from the Bush administration that spared three
Purdue executives from jail time in 2007 166 —but they are also legal and
practical. Convincing twelve jurors that blame for the opioid crisis lies with
individual corporate executives—executives whose companies were distributing
drugs that also addressed post-surgical pain and other very real medical
conditions—is not an easy task in any courtroom. Of course, our criminal justice
system visits harsh consequences on street-level dealers of chemically similar
substances on a daily basis, and the disparities in how we treat street-level drug
dealers and high-ranking pharmaceutical executives are stark. But it is far from
clear that treating the executive like the street-level drug dealer is the solution.
And in any event, the task of criminal justice reform is one of the few that is even
more daunting than the opioid epidemic. A broken criminal-justice system is
almost certainly not the opioid epidemic’s fix.
D. Demand-Side Subsidies: Medicare and Medicaid
Demand-side subsidies are another set of institutions that perhaps could
have but did not correct IP’s flaws as the opioid crisis sprung up and spread. The
largest government programs providing subsidies for prescription drugs are
Medicare Part D and Medicaid, which are administered at the federal level by
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Medicare Part D is an
opt-in federal benefit for people over 65 or with certain disabilities. 167 The
formula for benefits is complex, but in 2019, Medicare Part D covers seventyfive percent of brand-name costs up to an initial coverage limit of $3,820, after
a $415 deductible. 168 Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides
165 See Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Torts,
100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991) (noting that “[l]imited liability in tort has been the prevailing
rule for corporations in the United States, as elsewhere, for more than a century,” though arguing
for a change to this rule).
166 See Barry Meier, Why Drug Company Executives Haven’t Really Seen Justice for Their Role in the
Opioid Crisis, TIME (June 15, 2018), https://time.com/5311359/purdue-pharma-oxycontinlawsuit-opioid-crisis.
167 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89, at 27–28.
Medicare also provides limited coverage under Part B for some physician-administered drugs,
which does not include opioids but does include some addiction treatments. See Brett P. Giroir
& Kimberly Brandt, Testimony on Tracking Opioid and Substance Use Disorders in Medicare Medicaid, and
Human Services Programs before Committee on Finance, HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asl/testimony/2018-04/tracking-opioid-and-substanceuse-disorders-medicare-medicaid-hhs-programs.html.
168 An Overview of the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/an-overview-of-the-medicare-partd-prescription-drug-benefit. About 13 million out of 44 million Part D beneficiaries receive low-
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health care coverage for low-income individuals. Medicaid beneficiaries receive
full coverage for prescription drugs, with some states requiring a small co-pay.169
Within these limits, Medicare and Medicaid have generally reimbursed
the costs of prescription opioids such as OxyContin. Indeed, in 2016, opioids
were provided to one-third of Medicare Part D beneficiaries (14.4 million
individuals).170 The nearly 80 million opioid prescriptions cost taxpayers $4.1
billion.171 From 2011 to 2016, Medicaid reimbursed an average of 30 million
opioid prescriptions per year. 172 In contrast, even though almost half of
nonelderly adults with opioid use disorder are Medicaid beneficiaries, many
states deny or limit coverage for medication-assisted treatments such as
Suboxone, including by imposing barriers such as prior authorization
requirements.173 Part of the blame for the proliferation of opioids and the more
limited spread of opioid-addiction treatments may thus lie with the institutional
design choices that led to subsidies for opioids and not for addiction treatments.
This Section provides an in-depth look at the role of Medicare and
Medicaid in the opioid epidemic. First, we consider whether expanding access
to health care contributed to the crisis. Next, we examine whether a particular
aspect of Medicaid’s approach to pharmaceutical pricing had the unintended
consequence of limiting access to opioid antidotes. The claim that expanding
access to health care made the crisis worse turns out to be tenuous at best. But
as we seek to show in Section I.D.2, programmatic features of Medicaid may
indeed have had pernicious effects for patients.
1. Health Care Coverage and Opioid Use
Generally, demand-side subsidies for a product should result in lower
out-of-pocket per-unit costs for subsidy recipients and higher consumption
overall. That appears to be what happened with Medicare Part D. Economists
Mark Duggan and Fiona Scott Morton have shown that for drugs with
competitors in the same therapeutic class, the introduction of Medicare Part D
led to substantial price declines and increases in utilization. 174 Subsequent
income subsidies reducing their out-of-pocket spending. See SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF,
MEDICARE PART D PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40611.pdf.
169 See Medicaid Benefits: Prescription Drugs, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/prescription-drugs (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
170 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OPIOIDS IN
MEDICARE PART D; CONCERNS ABOUT EXTREME USE AND QUESTIONABLE PRESCRIBING 2
(2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-17-00250.pdf.
171 Id.
172 See Alana Sharp et al., Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Access to Opioid Analgesic Medications and
Medication-Assisted Treatment, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 642, 643 (2018).
173 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 70; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra
note 56, at 12–13, 123–26.
174 Mark Duggan & Fiona Scott Morton, The Effect of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical Prices
and Utilization, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 590 (2010); see also Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore
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studies have confirmed these findings in the opioid context: Part D coverage
reduced the out-of-pocket cost of prescription opioids for newly insured seniors
by roughly forty to fifty percent, and prescription opioid utilization among the
covered population increased more or less commensurately.175
While Medicare Part D appears to have contributed to the proliferation
of prescription opioids, the same does not appear to have been the case for
Medicaid. Rather, Medicaid-focused studies have found no statistically
significant relationship between Medicaid expansion and opioid use. 176 The
contrast between Medicare Part D and Medicaid presents a puzzle with at least
two potential answers.177
First, Medicaid establishes limits on reimbursements to pharmaceutical
manufacturers that are based on prices paid by non-Medicaid consumers such
that Medicaid receives the “best price” among purchasers.178 This arrangement
gives manufacturers an incentive to raise the prices that they charge to nonMedicaid consumers and thereby extract more revenue from the Medicaid
program, and Duggan and Scott Morton have shown that an increase in the
Medicaid market share is indeed associated with an increase in the average price
of a prescription.179 The result is that Medicaid coverage likely increases access
among Medicaid beneficiaries but has the opposite effect on non-beneficiaries.
Since Medicare Part D prices are not explicitly tied to rates in the rest of the
market, Medicare Part D does not create the same incentive for manufacturers
to hike prices. But this is at most a partial explanation: Medicaid expansion failed
Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
May 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441247 (arguing that access-focused proposals such as
“Medicare for All” should recognize how demand-side subsidies are connected to innovation
incentives).
175 See Aparna Soni, Health Insurance, Price Changes, and the Demand for Pain Relief Drugs: Evidence
from Medicare Part D 16–17 (Kelley Sch. Bus. Research Paper No. 19-4, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3268968 (finding 38% reduction in out-of-pocket costs and 74%
increase in morphine-milligram-equivalent consumption); David Powell, Rosalie Liccardo
Pacula & Erin Taylor, How Increasing Medical Access to Opioids Contributes to the Opioid Epidemic:
Evidence from Medicare Part D 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21072,
2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21072 (finding 48% reduction in out-of-pocket costs and
28% increase in number of prescriptions).
176 See Katherine Baicker et al., The Effect of Medicaid on Medication Use Among Poor Adults: Evidence
from Oregon, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2110 (2017) (finding that Oregon residents who were
randomized into a Medicaid expansion program were not more likely to use opioids); Alana
Sharp et al., Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Access to Opioid Analgesic Medications and MedicationAssisted Treatment, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 642 (2018) (finding that state populations covered by
Medicaid expansions were not more likely to use opioids but were more likely to use medicationassisted treatment (buprenorphine and naltrexone) for opioid use disorders).
177 These answers are certainly not exhaustive. The different populations treated by
Medicare and Medicaid may also play some role; for example, there may be greater unmet
demand for pain treatment among the more elderly Medicare beneficiaries.
178 See Ramsey Baghdadi, Medicaid Best Price, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000173/full. For an overview of
Medicaid pricing, see Sachs, supra note 27, at 182, 196.
179 Mark Duggan & Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Distortionary Effects of Government Procurement:
Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2006).
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to raise prescription opioid use in a statistically significant way not only at the
state level, but also at the individual level among newly covered Medicaid
beneficiaries.180 The null result of Medicaid coverage on prescription opioid use
is thus not simply a case of a positive effect on use among Medicaid beneficiaries
being offset by a negative effective on use among others.
A second plausible explanation for the Medicare/Medicaid contrast is
that while Medicare Part D expanded prescription drug coverage among seniors
who already had access to non-pharmaceutical care, Medicaid increased access
to both pharmaceuticals and other forms of healthcare. In the pain relief context,
healthcare and prescription painkillers may be substitutes, dampening the
impact of increased opioid access. Thus, even while Medicaid provides a
demand-side subsidy for prescription opioids, it also subsidizes certain forms of
non-pharmaceutical care that serve to reduce demand for prescription opioids.
In sum, demand-side subsidies do appear to have played a role in the
proliferation of prescription opioids, but the story is not a straightforward one.181
In particular, the contrast between Medicare Part D and Medicaid suggests that
subsidies for prescription drugs and broader health care subsidies may have
differential effects on opioid use. We return to this subject in Section II.B when
we consider the implications of our analysis for potential health care access
reforms.
2. The Medicaid Best Price Rule and Private Payers
Like OxyContin, Evzio has been the beneficiary of demand-side
subsidies. The federal government spent over $142 million on Evzio from its
2014 launch through August 2018, primarily through Medicare Part D and
Medicaid.182 Most of these expenditures occurred after Kaléo’s sales force began
urging prescribing doctors in 2016 to complete paperwork indicating that Evzio
was “medically necessary,” triggering coverage by both commercial and
government plans.183 In the first quarter of 2017, Medicare and Medicaid were
responsible for 24% of the 2522 units sold but 75% of the $7.94 million in net
sales.184
When setting the price of Evzio, Kaléo sought advice from a number of
industry consultants who offered widely varying recommendations. One
consultancy suggested a price of $125 per device, or $250 for a double-dose

See Baicker et al., supra note 176.
The Council of Economic Advisers, in its February 2020 Economic Report of the President,
argues that the decline in out-of-pocket opioid prices (driven largely by government subsidies)
accounts for a significant share of the rise in opioid deaths in recent years. See ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 228 (Feb. 2020) (“We estimate that the decline in observed out-ofpocket prices is capable of explaining between 31 and 83 percent of the growth in the death rate
involving prescription opioids from 2001 to 2010.”).
182 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89, at 74–84.
183 Id. at 4.
184 Id. at 5.
180
181
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packet.185 Another firm advised Kaléo to price its packets in the $300 to $350
range.186 A third recommended a target price per packet of $575, which is where
Evzio started out in 2014.187
Two Chicago-based consultants, Todd Smith and Benjamin Bove, were
hired in 2015 and offered up a very different strategy, which Kaléo ultimately
adopted. 188 Under the distribution model urged by Smith and Bove, Kaléo
promised to cover the copays of patients who received Evzio.189 These patients
would receive Evzio in the mail, bypassing the traditional pharmacy channel.190
Kaléo would charge sky-high prices (in the several thousands of dollars) to
commercial insurers, apparently with the expectation that some would not pay
but others would. 191 The strategy was described to 60 Minutes journalists by
former Kaléo employees as “a legal shell game to bilk insurance companies.”192
Kaléo’s shell game hit a number of roadblocks. Two of the three major
U.S. pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs),193 Express Scripts and CVS, removed
Evzio from their drug menus in 2016 and replaced it with the naloxone nasal
spray Narcan, 194 which is generally considered to be less user-friendly than
Evzio.195 Kaléo responded by terminating rebate agreements with the PBMs and
with CMS, allowing it to earn a higher profit per device.196 Kaléo received more
than $140 million in payments from Medicare Part D and Medicaid, but even
so, according to a Senate subcommittee report, Kaléo had not turned a profit on
Evzio as of 2018.197 Meanwhile, state and local governments—which were not
the beneficiaries of Kaléo’s zero-copay pledge—struggled to afford the $4100
drug. 198 Ultimately—though only after significant pressure from a Senate

Id. at 38.
Id.
187 Id. at 39–41.
188 Id. at 47.
189 Id. at 54–55.
190 Id. at 55.
191 Id. at 54–55.
192 60 Minutes: Evzio: The Overdose-Reversal Drug with a $4000+ Price Tag (CBS television
broadcast Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/evzio-the-opioid-overdosereversal-drug-naloxone-with-a-4000-price-tag-60-minutes.
193 PBMs are the middlemen between drug manufacturers and healthcare payers (including
commercial insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid), and three PBMs—CVS, Express Scripts, and
UnitedHealth’s Optum—account for over seventy percent of claims. See John Arnold, Are
Pharmacy Benefit Managers the Good Guys or the Bad Guys of Drug Pricing?, STAT (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/27/pharmacy-benefit-managers-good-or-bad.
194 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89, at 66–70.
195 See 60 Minutes: Evzio: The Overdose-Reversal Drug with a $4000+ Price Tag, supra note 192
(showing reporter Lesley Stahl struggling to administer Narcan but exclaiming that Evzio is
“[r]eally easy”).
196 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89, at 67, 79.
197 Id. at 74.
198 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
185
186
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investigation and critical news articles199—Kaléo began offering Evzio to first
responders for $180 in April 2018,200 and in December 2018, Kaléo announced
that a subsidiary will sell an authorized generic version for $178.201
One way to describe Kaléo’s strategy is as a failed effort at price
discrimination. If successful, price discrimination—charging different prices to
different consumers—could alleviate the allocative inefficiencies of patent
protection. As long as a firm can charge each consumer less than her willingness
to pay, then no one’s access will be limited, even if prices are well above marginal
cost for consumers whose willingness to pay is high.202 But a number of factors
stood in the way of Kaléo’s price discrimination gambit. For one, drug
manufacturers do not typically interact directly with consumers—hence Kaléo’s
effort to establish independent relationships through specialty pharmacies and
bypass traditional distribution channels. For another, federal law places some
limits on price discrimination. Drug manufacturers seeking Medicaid coverage
typically enter rebate agreements with CMS, with the rebate size guaranteeing
Medicaid the “best price” among purchasers.203 Specifically, Medicaid receives
a minimum rebate of 23.1 percent off the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP),
and if any private purchaser (or some public purchasers, including local
governments) receives more than this discount, Medicaid receives that “best
price.”204 This mandate made it unattractive for Kaléo to negotiate discounts
with individual PBMs.205 And even after Kaléo ended its rebate agreements, it
could (and did) receive Medicaid and Medicare Part D payments when doctors

See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89; see, e.g., 60
Minutes: Evzio: The Overdose-Reversal Drug with a $4000+ Price Tag, supra note 192; Luthra, supra
note 90; Dylan Scott, This Drug Saves Americans from Opioid Overdoses. Its Price Has Been Hiked 600
Percent,
VOX
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/11/19/18103361/opioid-overdose-naloxone-evzio-drug-prices.
200 See Press Release, Kaléo, EVZIO® (naloxone HCl injection, USP) Auto-Injector Now
Available to Patients in Select States Without a Prescription Through Kaléo’s New Virtual
Standing Order Pilot Program and to Government Agencies at a Direct Purchase Price (Apr. 5,
2018), https://kaleo.com/press-release/evzio-naloxone-hcl-injection-usp-auto-injector-nowavailable-to-patients-in-select-states-without-a-prescription-through-kaleos-new-virtualstanding-order-pilot-program-and-to-govern.
201 See Lev Facher, Kaleo, Maker of $4,100 Overdose Antidote, Authorizes a Generic Version for Just
$178, STAT (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/12/12/kaleo-evzio-overdoseantidote-generic.
202 See generally SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 37 (2004) (“The
deadweight loss imposed by a monopolist can be mitigated, and possibly eliminated, if the
monopolist can discriminate on price”).
203 See Baghdadi, supra note 178.
204 Id.
205 See id. (“One ripple effect of guaranteeing the best price for Medicaid is that it weakens
the leverage of private commercial payers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) in
negotiations with manufacturers, in effect setting a floor under prices. Private payers argue that
they would be able to negotiate even lower prices for patients if manufacturers were not obliged
to offer the same price to all fifty state Medicaid programs.”).
199
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certified Evzio as “medically necessary,” 206 but these payments could not be
higher than “usual and customary charges to the general public,” 207 again
limiting incentives to negotiate individual discounts.208
Under typical accounts of the patent system—including our own
previous work209—demand-side subsidies like Medicaid are viewed as a solution
to allocative inefficiencies. And there are indeed substantial demand-side
subsidies for Evzio through Medicaid and Medicare Part D. But they are not
playing the role they play in the classic story; instead, they appear to be
exacerbating the allocative problem. If the limits on charging CMS more than
the “best price” or the “usual and customary charges” did not exist, Kaléo might
well have reached agreements with individual purchasers such as cash-strapped
local governments or patients without insurance that preserved patient access to
Evzio (thereby lowering deadweight loss). But with these limits in the
background, Kaléo had less incentive to strike deals with private purchasers that
would have reduced what it could charge the federal government.210
The Kaléo story thus confirms and challenges our view of patent law. It
confirms the view that monopoly power can, under certain conditions, lead to
supracompetitive prices and suboptimal output. It challenges the view of
demand-side subsidies as an easy solution to the problem. This is not to say that
demand-side subsidies could not address the allocative problem here. It is, instead,
to illustrate that the design details of those subsidies are critically important, and
that non-patent policies can magnify as well as mitigate the patent system’s
pathologies.

See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 89, at 74, 80
(reporting that from January to August 2018, Medicare Part D paid over $45 million and
Medicaid paid over $5 million for Evzio); see id. at 1 (describing sales efforts focused on getting
doctors to sign “paperwork indicating that EVZIO was medically necessary, which ensured the
drug would be covered by government programs like Medicare and Medicaid”).
207 42 CFR § 447.512(b)(2). This regulation was renumbered from § 447.331 in 2007. See 72
Fed. Reg. 39,142, 39,154 (July 17, 2007).
208 There is relatively little discussion in case law or legal commentary about the effect of this
“usual and customary” limit on pharmaceutical prices because most firms voluntarily enter
rebate agreements with CMS, but the inability to charge CMS more that the “usual and
customary charges to the general public” has limited price discrimination in other
pharmaceutical contexts. See United States ex rel. Garbe v. Kmart Corp., 824 F.3d 632, 644 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“Regulations related to ‘usual and customary’ price should be read to ensure that
where the pharmacy regularly offers a price to its cash purchasers of a particular drug, Medicare
Part D receives the benefit of that deal.”).
209 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 563, 594–95 (describing Medicaid as the closest
example in the United States to “matching” of an IP innovation incentive with a non-IP
allocation mechanism to reduce allocative inefficiencies).
210 To be clear, the “best price” mandate does permit a variety of novel pricing arrangements,
including pay-for-value models, as explained by Rachel Sachs, Nicholas Bagley & Darius N.
Lakdawalla, Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 43 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 5 (2018). But Kaléo could not, for example, charge $200 to poorer purchasers
while charging $4000 to Medicaid.
206
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E. Where Were the Alternative Pain and Addiction Treatments?
Thus far, this Part has illustrated the history of the opioid crisis through
a tale of three drugs. But why is it a tale of three drugs? Here, we explain how the
U.S. patent system helped lead to the current opioid epidemic not only through
its incentives to commercialize prescription pain treatments, but also through its
failure to provide incentives for alternative non-pharmacological pain and
addiction treatments. There are, of course, important differences between the
problem of treating chronic pain and the problem of treating those addicted to
opioids, including the differential role of politics, which we turn to in Section
II.C. We think it is worth emphasizing, however, the common institutional
distortions that affected the market for innovations in both contexts.
The patent system is designed to mitigate the problem of
underinvestment in innovation. Knowledge goods present a classic public goods
problem: producers underinvest because knowledge goods often benefit persons
other than the producer (nonrivalry) who are hard to exclude from their benefits
(nonexcludability), and rational firms do not account for these benefits in their
investment decisions. 211 Patent law addresses this problem by making many
knowledge goods more excludable. But as Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed
have explained, this system creates a skew in research toward innovations that
can be excluded through patents, such as pharmaceuticals.212
Many solutions to chronic pain are not easily patentable. Even within the
pharmaceutical space, it is difficult to patent (or to enforce patents on) new uses
of existing drugs. 213 Information that corrects misinformation about existing
drugs is also difficult to patent or commodify.214 Recent randomized controlled
trials have suggested that opioids may be no more effective than certain nonopioids at treating both acute and chronic pain.215 Why weren’t these studies
conducted before opioid misuse became a national crisis? Why aren’t these nonopioid treatment strategies being aggressively promoted even now? A substantial
part of the answer is likely the inability to patent or commodify these findings:
no one firm can capture the significant public benefit of correcting
misinformation about opioid efficacy.
Patents are even less effective at incentivizing pain-treatment research
that is not related to a commodifiable pill. The 2017 National Academies report
on pain management stressed the importance of additional research on nonpharmacologic interventions that may be more effective than medications,
including acupuncture, physical therapy and exercise, cognitive behavioral

See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101
MINN. L. REV. 167, 170 (2016) (explaining this theory and numerous caveats).
212 Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 23.
213 See Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337821.
214 See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 (2012); supra note
110 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
211

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534721

2/21/20

INNOVATION INSTITUTIONS AND THE OPIOID CRISIS

41

therapy, and mindfulness meditation.216 But even if firms could overcome the
legal hurdles to patenting improvements to these methods of pain
management, 217 it would be difficult to monitor the dispersed use of these
knowledge goods and to enforce these legal rights.218
Ideally, these patent law failures could be corrected by government-set
incentives such as increased grant spending on alternative pain treatments and
increased subsidies to expand the market for resulting interventions. But while
CMS generally reimbursed the costs of prescription opioids, it did not reimburse
the costs of many non-opioid pain treatments such as acupuncture or behavioral
programs. 219 This coverage choice makes non-pharmacological treatments
more expensive to patients, even if they are more cost-effective overall.
Worse yet, CMS may have inadvertently pushed physicians to rely more
heavily on prescription opioids through its use of pain management questions on
patient satisfaction surveys.220 Specifically, the Hospital Consumer Assessment
of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey—introduced by CMS
in 2006 and administered to patients after discharge 221 —asked in its nowcontroversial Question 14: “How often did the hospital or provider do
everything in their power to control your pain?” 222 Providers anecdotally
observed that patients who received opioid prescriptions were more likely to
provide favorable survey responses.223 The stakes for hospitals were reputational
as well as financial. Starting in 2007, hospitals receiving payments from
Medicare for inpatient stays were required to collect and submit HCAPHS data,
which was then made publicly available. 224 The rewards for high HCAPHS
scores increased after the Affordable Care Act explicitly tied hospital
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 150, at 84–91.
New knowledge about the relative efficacy of existing treatment methods would fail the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, and patents on novel
methods would likely be challenged as patent-ineligible abstract ideas or laws of nature, see Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
218 Many activities by medical professionals are exempt from liability under 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c), and activities that can be performed by patients at home—such as exercise and other
healthy lifestyle changes—would be very difficult to monitor.
219 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 56–57.
220 See Jerome Adams, Gregory H. Bledsoe & John H. Armstrong, Are Pain Management
Questions in Patient Satisfaction Surveys Driving the Opioid Epidemic, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 985
(2016); Teresa A. Rummans, Caroline Burton & Nancy L. Dawson, How Good Intentions Contributed
to Bad Outcomes: The Opioid Crisis, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 344 (2018).
221 HCAHPS Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.hcahpsonline.org/globalassets/hcahps/facts/hcahps_fact_sheet_november_2017
.pdf.
222 Adams et al., supra note 220, at 985.
223 See Anna Lembke, The Opioid Epidemic Is a Symptom of Our Faltering Healthcare System, BMJ
OPINION (Oct. 31, 2017), https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2017/10/31/anna-lembke-the-opioidepidemic-is-a-symptom-of-our-faltering-healthcare-system (“Doctors’ salary and professional
advancement are tied to how well patients rate them on ‘patient satisfaction surveys.’ Doctors
are desperate to avoid bad ratings, and will write a prescription for an opioid, even when it’s not
indicated, to avoid a dissatisfied customer.”).
224 HCAHPS Fact Sheet, supra note 221, at 2.
216
217

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534721

2/21/20

INNOVATION INSTITUTIONS AND THE OPIOID CRISIS

42

reimbursements in part to a hospital’s HCAHPS performance.225 Hospitals were
effectively rewarded (or, at least, believed they were being rewarded 226 ) for
alleviating short-term pain with opioids and were not subsequently punished
when their patients or their patients’ relatives started abusing the drugs.
In short, instead of offsetting the patent system’s skew toward addictive
pharmacological pain treatments, other federal policies amplified patent law’s
flaws. The patent system is only one among a complex of innovation institutions
that can balance each other’s biases, but here, non-patent innovation institutions
did more to exacerbate than to equilibrate the tilt toward prescription opioids.
As we discuss in the Parts that follow, the failures of non-patent innovation
institutions in the opioid crisis inform potential near-term policy responses to the
ongoing epidemic as well as long-term efforts at innovation policy reform.

II. Mixing, Matching, and Layering Innovation Policies to
Address the Opioid Crisis
While the design of U.S. innovation institutions created conditions that
allowed the opioid crisis to develop, these institutions also can play an important
role in helping resolve (or at least contain) the epidemic. The causes of opioid
addiction and overdose are manifold, but knowledge goods (or the lack thereof)
play a critical role at each step along the way. Greater access to affordable
nonaddictive pain treatment alternatives would stem the spread of prescription
opioids in the first place. Technologically assisted early interventions can halt
transitions from opioid use to opioid abuse. Medication-assisted treatments can
put patients with opioid abuse disorders on the path to discovery. And
widespread availability of opioid antidotes such as naloxone can avert
catastrophic outcomes when earlier efforts fail.
In prior work, we have drawn a distinction between the incentives that
innovation institutions provide to producers of knowledge goods and the
allocation mechanisms that innovation institutions establish to govern access to
knowledge goods.227 Here, we apply this framework to the challenges presented
by the opioid epidemic. Section II.A considers ways in which innovation
institutions can spur the development of technologies that reduce addiction and
overdose risks. Section II.B examines policies that can ensure broader access to
knowledge goods that fight the opioid epidemic. Finally, Section II.C places
these potential policy responses within a broader political and social context. To
some degree, the failures of innovation institutions during the opioid crisis reflect
underlying inequalities and political pathologies that innovation policy reform is
unlikely to solve. In still other respects, however, the crisis was precipitated and
Id.
Whether high rates of opioid prescription actually boosted HCAHPS scores is a subject
of some ambiguity. See Jay S. Lee, Hsou M. Hu & Chad M. Brummett, Postoperative Opioid
Prescribing and the Pain Scores on Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey,
317 JAMA 2013 (2017) (finding no correlation between postoperative opioid prescribing and
HCAHPS scores).
227 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21.
225
226
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perpetuated by policy mistakes that can be corrected, even though the human
and economic costs of past mistakes cannot be erased.
A. Incentivizing Pain- and Addiction-Related Innovation
1. Intellectual Property and Market Incentives
Conventionally, innovation scholars have focused on patent law as the
main policy tool to increase production of new knowledge goods.228 Patents, at
least in theory, leverage private information from market actors about the value
and viability of potential projects and provide strong incentives for investments
in promising ideas.229 But as emphasized in Section I.B, these same features of
the patent system encouraged the development and commercialization of
prescription opioids. Given the patent system’s pro-pharmaceutical skew—and,
in particular, its bias toward addictive goods—one natural response might be to
write off patents as a potential solution to a problem that, in many respects, is a
product of too many pills.
We think that would be a mistake. As awareness grows among physicians
and patients about the addiction risk associated with prescription opioids,
demand for nonaddictive pain treatments will increase too. The patent system
will generate strong financial incentives for pharmaceutical and biotech firms to
invest in the development of non-opioid painkillers, 230 abuse-resistant
opioids,, 231 drugs that can be used to treat addiction, 232 and easier delivery
methods for the overdose antidote naloxone. 233 (Indeed, many firms already
have. 234) There is, to be sure, something unseemly about the very firms that
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576
(2003) (“Patent law is our primary policy tool to promote innovation.”).
229 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 554–57.
230 See Tamara Mathias, U.S. Regulators Snip Red Tape for Medical Devices to Curb Opioid Crisis,
REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-focus/u-sregulators-snip-red-tape-for-medical-devices-to-curb-opioid-crisis-idUSKCN1NE0GQ
(“Drugmakers including Pfizer Inc, Eli Lilly and Co, Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc and Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Inc have been packing their pipelines with potential solutions to the
crisis and there are 120 non-opioid drugs under FDA review this year, up some 650 percent since
2013 . . . .”).
231 FDA-approved abuse-deterrent opioids, none of which have generic alternatives, are
listed
at
Abuse-Deterrent
Opioid
Analgesics,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandPr
oviders/ucm600788.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2018).
232 See Information About Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), supra note 55 (listing approved
products). Most of these products are heavily patented. See Orange Book, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (search for the
product name and then click on the “Appl No” and “Patent and Exclusivity Information”); see
also Orexo AB v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 903 F.3d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reversing a judgment
of invalidity for a buprenorphine patent).
233 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
234 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 88; Nic Fleming, The Search for the Perfect Painkiller,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/28/opioids-the228
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fueled the spread of prescription opioids also profiting from the problem they
helped create. Many Americans were thus understandably outraged to learn that
Purdue Pharma has filed for a patent on a drug that could “help wean addicts
from opioids,” given that Purdue had helped to hook some of those same people
on opioids in the first place.235 It would be an even crueler irony, though, if the
patent system failed to reward investments in innovations that could bring the
opioid epidemic under control, and thereby encouraged the proliferation of
prescription opioids but not the development of solutions to addiction.
Of course, these powerful patent incentives still may be subject to the
same distortions described in Part I. Patents also skew research toward
treatments that require repeated use—and thus generate steady streams of
revenue—rather than preventatives which are effective after a single
administration.236 Patent law may therefore be more helpful, for example, in
encouraging the development of nonaddictive painkillers than in the
development of anti-addiction vaccines.237 Patent law likewise will do little to
facilitate research and development directed at ideas that are difficult for a single
firm to commodify—for example, reducing the default number of pills per
prescription, 238 informing doctors when their patients overdose, 239 or
encouraging the use of alternative pain treatments such as physical or behavioral
therapy. 240 Patents are also ineffective incentives for non-pharmaceutical
addiction recovery tools such as mobile-phone reminders that track the number
search-for-the-perfect-painkiller-tens-of-thousands-us-deaths-g-protein-coupled-receptor;
Mathias, supra note 230. For examples of recent patents on devices for treating pain through
neural stimulation, see U.S. Patent No. 9,925,384 (filed Sept. 1, 2016), and U.S. Patent No.
9,855,427 (filed Mar. 9, 2017).
235 Lindsey Bever, The Man Who Made Billions of Dollars from OxyContin is Pushing a Drug to Wean
Addicts
off
Opioids,
WASH.
POST.
(Sept.
8,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/09/08/the-man-who-madebillions-of-dollars-from-oxycontin-is-pushing-a-drug-to-wean-addicts-off-opioids; see also Lily
Dancyger, OxyContin Maker Granted Patent for Opioid Addiction Treatment, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 11,
2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/oxycontin-purdue-pharma-patentopioid-addiction-treatment-722646 (“The idea of Purdue and the Sacklers swooping in with the
cure for an epidemic they have profited from, with a new product that will make them even
richer, however, feels like the darkest form of capitalist absurdity—and like maybe it’s time to
make a corporate version of the Son of Sam laws, which prohibit murderers from profiting from
their crimes.”).
236 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Q. Claire Xue, Intellectual Property and the Market for
Vaccines (Feb. 5, 2020) (unpublished manuscript); see also Michael Kremer & Christopher M.
Snyder, Preventatives Versus Treatments, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1167 (2015) (providing an economic
analysis of other biases that distort R&D toward treatments rather than preventatives).
237 On not-yet-successful efforts to create a vaccine against addictive drugs, see Michael
Torrice, Vaccines Against Addictive Drugs Push Forward Despite Past Failures, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS
(Feb.
19,
2018),
https://cen.acs.org/articles/96/i8/Vaccines-against-addictive-drugspush.html.
238 See Alexander S. Chiu et al., Association of Lowering Default Pill Counts in Electronic Medical
Record Systems with Postoperative Opioid Prescribing, 153 JAMA SURGERY 1012 (2018).
239 See Jason N. Doctor et al., Opioid Prescribing Decreases After Learning of a Patient’s Fatal Overdose,
361 SCIENCE 588 (2018).
240 See supra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.
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of days that a patient has remained substance-free,241 for creative ideas like using
reverse-motion detectors in clinic bathrooms (i.e., devices that detect lack of
motion) to prevent fatal overdoses,242 and for research on the comparative value
of supervised drug use clinics243 or different drug court protocols or streamlined
ER-to-outpatient transfers for preventing relapse.244
Episodes such as Indivior’s effort to undermine the tablet form of
Suboxone245 highlight the need to consider broad changes to patent law and its
interactions with FDA regulatory law, antitrust law, tort law, and other
institutions that might cabin its pathologies. 246 These changes, however, may
take years to formulate and implement. In the meantime, the opioid epidemic’s
daily death toll reminds us of “the fierce urgency of now.”247 While patents may
play a role in promoting the development and commercialization of opioid
alternatives, antidotes, and addiction treatments, we think it is clear enough that
America will not patent its way out of the opioid crisis. Policymakers will need
to look elsewhere for solutions.
2. Ex Ante Government Spending: Grants and Contracts
Patents, fortunately, are not the only choice in the innovation policy
toolkit. Another major innovation lever is direct government R&D spending
through grants, contracts, and national laboratories, which collectively account
for about one-quarter of the $500 billion spent on U.S. R&D each year. 248
Government-set rewards can encourage innovation in areas where patent law
fails (e.g., where welfare-enhancing ideas are difficult to commodify). 249 But

See Orly Nadell Farber, Can a Phone App’s Warnings to Avoid Risky Friends and Places Prevent
Opioid Addiction Relapses?, STAT (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/07/canphone-app-prevent-opioid-addiction-relapses.
242 See MACY, supra note 120, at 288.
243 See Bob Oakes & Martha Bebinger, Somerville Mayor Plans to Open a Supervised Consumption
Site
Next
Year,
WBUR
(Aug.
14,
2019),
https://amp.wbur.org/commonhealth/2019/08/14/curtatone-supervised-illegal-drug-use.
244 See MACY, supra note 120, at 220, 301.
245 See Section I.A.2.
246 See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 150, at 410–14 (arguing that
the FDA should incorporate public health considerations into regulatory decisions, which could
be used to block products for which the negative externalities swamp the social benefits);
Engstrom & Mello, supra note 164 (discussing the importance of tort litigation in responding to
the crisis); Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590 (2018)
(suggesting legal changes to cabin extensions of exclusivity with limited public health benefits);
infra notes 324–326 (discussing potential doctrinal changes to patent law’s utility requirement
and remedies rules to incorporate broader social welfare concerns).
247 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial
(Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE 218 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
248 See NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, at 4-20 tbl.4-3 (2018),
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf.
249 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 555; W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1 (2019).
241
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government-set rewards are, as we discuss below, vulnerable to pathologies of
their own.
The United States already does provide direct funding for research
related to opioids and alternatives, mostly at federal level through the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). In 2017, the NIH spent $516 million on pain-related
research and $1.6 billion on all forms of substance abuse (of which opioids are
only one fraction).250 In fiscal year 2018, Congress nearly doubled NIH funding
for research on opioid addiction with an additional $500 million.251 Yet these
investments, while nontrivial, are on a scale too small for a problem whose
economic costs likely top $500 billion annually.252 For example, opioid-related
research funding is less than the $3 billion the NIH provides each year for
HIV/AIDS research,253 even though in 2016, there were over ten times more
Americans abusing prescription pain relievers than living with HIV,254 and more
Americans now die from opioid overdoses than died from the AIDS epidemic at
its peak.255
The 2017 National Academies report recommended that the United
States invest more heavily in research on pain and on opioid use disorder.256 We
agree, and we think understanding the failures of innovation institutions that
contributed to the present crisis can help policymakers direct this funding to
where it is most needed. For example, although patent law is likely to incentivize
investment in new non-addictive pharmaceutical pain treatments, it is less likely
to encourage research on non-pharmaceutical (and in most cases unpatentable)
pain treatments such as acupuncture, physical therapy and exercise, cognitive
behavioral therapy, and mindfulness meditation. 257 And while patent law
potentially rewards firms for developing opioid antidotes such as Evzio and
pharmacological addiction treatments such as Suboxone, it does much less to
encourage research into other addiction management mechanisms (e.g.,
counseling as a complement to medication-assisted treatment258). Grantmaking
Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and Disease Categories (RCDC), NAT’L INSTS.
(May 18, 2018), https://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx.
251 Francis S. Collins, Walter J. Koroshetz & Nora D. Volkow, Helping to End Addiction Over the
Long-Term: The Research Plan for the NIH HEAL Initiative, 320 JAMA 129 (2018).
252 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
253 See Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and Disease Categories (RCDC), supra note
250.
254 Compare SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 50, at 170525
tbl. 1.97A (eleven million), with HIV in the United States and Dependent Areas, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/ataglance.html (last
updated Jan. 29, 2019) (one million).
255 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
256 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 150, at 162–63.
257 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
258 Findings on the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy for patients simultaneously
receiving medication-assisted treatment for opioid abuse are decidedly mixed. Compare David A.
Fielin et al., A Randomized Trial of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Primary Care-based Buprenorphine, 126
AM. J. MED. 74.e11 (2013) (finding no statistically significant difference on effectiveness measures
250
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agencies should consider the patent system’s skews when allocating funds so that
their dollars can do the most good—which likely means that resources should be
directed at precisely the areas that the patent system leaves untouched.
In making these recommendations, we are cognizant that in the realworld of federal grants and contracts, politics as well as policy considerations
shape outcomes. For example, one study finds that each additional member on
the House subcommittee that oversees the NIH’s budget is associated with a
roughly nine percent increase in NIH grants to public universities in that
member’s state259—suggesting that grant allocations may not be based purely on
the merits of potential projects. Universities spend many millions of dollars each
year lobbying Congress and federal agencies for more grant money, 260 and
certainly some of this spending can be fairly characterized as rent-seeking.
Increasing the amount of federal spending on opioid-related research will likely
increase the social cost of competition among politicians and potential grantees
for funds. Yet these rent-seeking costs pale in comparison to the costs of patent
litigation261 and seem rather trivial when compared with the magnitude of the
crisis that opioid-related R&D addresses. That the federal R&D grant process
remains far from perfect is, we think, both undeniably true and also not a
compelling argument against dramatic increases in opioid-related grantmaking.
3. Ex Post Government Spending: Prizes and Market
Subsidies
Government grants—i.e., direct, ex ante public funding for research and
development—are both familiar and popular, with polling suggesting that eight
in ten U.S. adults think government investments in medical research “usually
pay off in the long run.”262 Less well recognized—at least outside the innovation
between patients receiving Suboxone and patients receiving Suboxone plus cognitive behavioral
therapy), with Brent A. Moore, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Improves Treatment Outcomes for Prescription
Opioid Users in Primary Care Buprenorphine Treatment, 71 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 54
(2017) (finding that cognitive behavioral therapy increases probability of abstinence among
prescription opioid abusers but not heroin abusers).
259 Deepak Hegde & David C. Mowery, Politics and Funding in the U.S. Public Biomedical R&D
System, 322 SCIENCE 1797, 1798 (2008).
260 See Rick Cohen, Universities Pay Plenty for Influence and Access Through Lobbying, NONPROFIT
Q. (July 16, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/07/16/universities-pay-plenty-forinfluence-and-access-through-lobbying; Monica Vendituoli, Top Schools for Federal R&D Grants Are
Big Spenders on Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, OPEN SECRETS (June 5, 2013),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/06/federal-research-and-development-fu.
261 See Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.bna.com/cost-patent-infringement-n73014463011 (reporting
that even with new lower-cost procedures for challenging patents, the median cost for a patent
infringement case with $1 million to $10 million at stake was still $1.7 million in 2017); see also
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV.
303, 365 (2013) (estimating the total annual cost of patent litigation to be around $2.5 billion).
262 See Brian Kennedy, Americans Broadly Favor Government Funding for Medical and Science Research,
PEW RES. CTR. FACT TANK (July 3, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/07/03/americans-broadly-favor-government-funding-for-medical-and-scienceresearch.
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policy literature263—is that the government can also choose to reward specific
technologies ex post through prize systems. Because ex post rewards are only
given to successful researchers, they can provide stronger incentives for ingenuity
and effort, at least as long as researchers can acquire necessary bridge financing
until their ideas reach fruition.264
Innovation inducement prizes are a small but growing portion of U.S.
innovation institutions,265 including in the opioid context. The NIH is offering
$2.5 million for five challenges related to developing open-source databases,
algorithms, and biological assays to streamline development of treatments for
pain, opioid use disorder, and opioid overdose.266 Other prize competitions offer
financial awards for developing the most promising solutions for tackling a broad
portion of the opioid problem, without specifying a particular technological
goal.267 For example, the federal Health Resources and Services Administration,
an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
is offering up to $375,000 for innovations that address any “barriers that limit
access to quality treatment . . . for those with Opioid Use Disorder (OUD),
including pregnant women and new moms.”268 And the HHS two-day Opioid
Code-a-Thon distributed three $10,000 prizes for “data-driven solutions to
combat the opioid epidemic.”269 Several states have launched prize competitions
of their own. For example, an Ohio prize competition awarded $200,000 in 2018
to each of twelve winners working on technologies to address drug abuse and
addiction.270 And most recently, a New York state prize competition focused on
novel solutions to the opioid epidemic awarded a grand prize of $10,000 to a
team developing a new intranasal naloxone patch in January 2019.271

Among innovation scholars, debates on the value of prizes as an innovation policy have
been ongoing since at least the nineteenth century. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent
Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 19 (1950). For a more recent discussion of
innovation prizes, see Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and
Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2016).
264 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 556–57.
265 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 261, at 317–18.
266
2018
NCATS
ASPIRE
Design
Challenges,
NAT’L
INSTS. HEALTH,
https://ncats.nih.gov/aspire/challenges (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). We have argued that prize
competitions may be particularly effective for this kind of computational challenge, where capital
constraints typically are not binding. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 261, at 317–376.
267 See generally Jason Reinecke, General Innovation Competitions, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128
(2018) (describing this kind of competition).
268 Addressing Opioid Use Disorder in Pregnant Women and New Moms: Timeline, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., https://mchbgrandchallenges.hrsa.gov/challenges/addressingopioid-use-disorder-pregnant-women-and-new-moms/timeline (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
269
HHS Opioid Code-a-Thon, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/challenges/code-a-thon/index.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2018).
270 See Ohio Opioid Technology Challenge, OHIO DEV. SERVS. AGENCY (last updated Sept. 2018),
https://development.ohio.gov/bs_thirdfrontier/ootc.htm.
271 See Empire State Opioid Epidemic Innovation Challenge, CAMTECH (Jan. 2019),
http://www.globalhealthmgh.org/camtech/new-york-city-opioid-epidemic-challenge-summitsolutions-sprint.
263
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Many opioid-related prize competitions offer funding at such a small
scale that they seem unlikely to overcome financial barriers to addressing the
epidemic—although prizes can have effects beyond direct monetary rewards.
Economists Petra Moser and Tom Nicholas have demonstrated that prizes also
encourage innovation through publicity, independent from the inducement
effect of financial incentives.272 As a possible illustration of this effect, the FDA
ran a prize competition for opioid-related medical devices that came with no
cash prize—winners received only “enhanced interactions with FDA review
divisions” and “Breakthrough Device designation.”273 Despite the lack of direct
financial reward, the competition generated significant interest, with 250
applications, from which eight winners were selected.274
Where innovation inducement prizes are explicitly financial, moreover,
they need not be structured as offering a fixed amount of money for a particular
technological development. The prize can also be tied to some market outcome,
with larger prizes corresponding to greater use of the resulting technology by
consumers. For example, rather than offering $100 million for creation of a new
vaccine, a prize sponsor could offer $50 per person actually inoculated—an
intermediate solution between government-set fixed prizes and market-set
patent rewards.275 This kind of market-based prize has been used to incentivize
distribution of pneumococcal vaccines.276 But such a structure is not limited to
small demonstration projects: demand-side government subsidies for certain
technologies, such as through insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid,

272 Petra Moser & Tom Nicholas, Prizes, Publicity and Patents: Non-Monetary Awards as a
Mechanism to Encourage Innovation, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 763 (2013).
273
Press
Release,
Food
&
Drug
Admin.
(May
30,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm609188.htm. The
competition was broadly open to any opioid-related devices, including devices related to
“diagnostics to identify patients at increased risk for addiction, treatments for pain that eliminate
the need for opioid analgesics (such as opioid-sparing or replacement therapies for acute or
chronic pain), treatments for opioid use disorder or symptoms of opioid withdrawal, as well as
devices or technologies that can prevent diversion of prescription opioids.” Id.
274 FDA Innovation Challenge: Devices to Prevent and Treat Opioid Use Disorder, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CD
RH/CDRHInnovation/ucm609082.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2018). To be sure, the absence
of a clear counterfactual makes it difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the causal effect
of these programs. See generally Heidi Williams, Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to
Policy, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 752, 768 (2012) (describing this evaluation problem). And while
rewards are not directly financial, they may be indirectly so. For example, Breakthrough Device
designation may help manufacturers obtain FDA approval at a quicker clip—thus bringing the
product to market sooner and increasing total profits over the device’s life. See Breakthrough Devices
Program, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/how-study-andmarket-your-device/breakthrough-devices-program (last updated May 16, 2019).
275 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 554.
276 See generally Williams, supra note 274, at 752, 758–59, 769–70 (describing this
pneumococcal prize and the challenges in measuring its effectiveness).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534721

2/21/20

INNOVATION INSTITUTIONS AND THE OPIOID CRISIS

50

bear some similarities to market-based prizes277 (though they may also introduce
new distortions, as discussed above278).
The federal government has offered some targeted subsidies focused on
relieving the opioid crisis. Most notably, the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) distributed over $1 billion in State
Opioid Response Grants, focused on “increasing access to medication-assisted
treatment using the three [FDA] approved medications for the treatment of
opioid use disorder, reducing unmet treatment need, and reducing opioid
overdose related deaths through the provision of prevention, treatment and
recovery activities for opioid use disorder.” 279 If firms expect this kind of
demand-side subsidy to expand the market for a particular medical intervention,
the subsidy can enhance incentives to develop technologies in that area in the
first place.
Grants administered at the state level also provide some opportunity to
learn from state experimentation with opioid abuse treatment models—policy
variation is important in the face of uncertainty about which policies are most
effective. 280 Indeed, SAMHSA grants explicitly include funding for
“identify[ing] which system design models will most rapidly and adequately
address the gaps in their systems of care.”281 Some learning has already occurred
from state-level responses: for example, Virginia’s 2017 increase in Medicaid
reimbursement rates to addiction treatment providers seems to have reduced
opioid-related emergency department visits by expanding the supply of (and thus
access to) addiction treatment services.282 To encourage policy experimentation,
federal policymakers should consider ways to reward states that use SAMHSA
grants or other funding sources to develop innovative approaches that are
adopted by other states. To the extent the results of state-level innovation are
patentable, states could internalize some out-of-state benefits from their
innovation. 283 But while this benefit-internalization approach might work for
277 See Lemley et al., supra note 174; Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes:
Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1011–14 (2014); Sachs, supra note 27.
278 See supra Section I.D.
279 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Awards Over $1 Billion to
Combat
the
Opioid
Crisis
(Sept.
19,
2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/09/19/hhs-awards-over-1-billion-combat-opioidcrisis.html.
280 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015).
281 State Opioid Response Grants, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/ti-18-015 (last updated Aug. 3, 2018).
282 See German Lopez, We Really Do Have a Solution to the Opioid Epidemic—and One State Is
Showing It Works, VOX (May 10, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/5/10/17256572/opioid-epidemic-virginia-medicaid-expansion-arts.
For
a
description of another innovative state program, see German Lopez, I Looked for a State That’s
Taken the Opioid Epidemic Seriously. I Found Vermont., VOX (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/30/16339672/opioid-epidemic-vermonthub-spoke.
283 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 550 (referring to this combination of innovation
policies as “layering,” or “the use of different policies at different jurisdictional levels, such as
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some technologies such as medical devices, most state-level opioid-related
innovations are less likely to generate financial rewards commensurate with their
social value, making the need for federal innovation incentives all the more
acute.284
The overall efficacy of the SAMHSA grant program is yet to be seen, but
a recent investigative report into the District of Columbia’s execution of its grants
raises an important cautionary note.285 The District won $4 million through the
grant program, but “many programs the city said it would launch never
materialized,” and “[o]fficials at the clinic contracted by the District with most
of its federal funds said not a single patient has been referred to them for
addiction treatment.”286 This story serves as another reminder that non-market
solutions are not a panacea: failures of the political market can be just as
devastating, and comparisons of innovation institutions must consider the
imperfections of each policy choice. We return to these political concerns in
Section II.C.
B. Allocating Access to Pain- and Addiction-Related Innovations
The opioid epidemic stems in part from our failure to develop and refine
non-addictive pain treatments, addiction prevention technologies, and successful
therapies for substance abuse. But the opioid crisis is not only a crisis of
innovation; it is also a crisis of access. In some cases, expensive but effective
patent-protected technologies remain out of patients’ reach. In other instances,
non-patent-protected treatments are available at reasonable cost, but public and
private sector health insurance plans fail to cover them or regulatory barriers
limit patient access. In this Section, we consider a combination of interventions
that would expand access to technologies that can avert, treat, and contain the
consequences of opioid addiction.
Importantly, as we have explained, these allocation choices can be
largely separated from the choice of innovation incentive, and increasing access
does not necessarily imply a decreased reward for the innovator.287 But questions
of incentives and allocation are not hermetically sealed off from one another. In
some cases, access-related policy levers should be used to decrease the reward to
the innovator, such as when a product that generates negative externalities is
subjected to a Pigouvian tax. In other cases, access-related policies can be used
to increase rewards to innovation, as when firms expect demand-side subsidies to
using non-IP innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms at the domestic level within an
international legal system oriented around IP”).
284 See generally Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 546 (2008)
(“[F]ree-rider problems, failure to internalize benefits to other jurisdictions from innovation,
network externalities, and spillovers may reduce policy variation in multi-jurisdictional systems
to a level far below optimality.”).
285
Peter Jamison, ‘Pure Incompetence,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/dc-opioid-epidemic-response-africanamericans.
286 Id.
287 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21.
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boost their profits from new products. Policymakers should remain attentive to
the incentive effects of their real-world allocational choices while also
understanding the possibility of disaggregating rewards and access.
1. The Case for Open Access
The benefit of expanding access to innovations that will address the
opioid crisis should be obvious: stemming the enormous human cost of chronic
pain and addiction. But should policymakers be concerned about losing some of
the informational value of proprietary pricing? As Glen Weyl and Jean Tirole
have explained, market prices often serve a useful screening function: when
consumers are willing to pay higher prices for a new product, it signals that they
assign a high value to that product relative to any substitutes.288 But there are a
host of reasons that the screening function of proprietary pricing fails in the
context of pain- and addiction-related innovations.
These problems largely mirror the shortcomings of patent incentives in
these contexts. As noted above, market value does not reflect social value in the
presence of the externalities and internalities that beset markets for addictive
products. These markets have also been plagued with misinformation that
further misaligns economic rewards and social value. 289 Additionally, even if
detailed information about relative clinical efficacy were available, those
suffering from opioid use disorder and perhaps some pain patients probably are
not operating at full rationality.290 It is hard for lay people and even doctors291
to understand the complex statistical evidence needed to evaluate medical
information, and it seems implausible that the choice between two treatment
options for addiction will typically be grounded in a full understanding of their
comparative value.
Just as market prices can fail to accurately signal social value when
consumers lack relevant information, they also can fail when consumers are not
the ones paying the patent owner’s price, such that consumption signals little
about the relative value of innovations. Allocation of medical technologies in the
United States—and most other countries—is far from a pure user-pays system.
As previously discussed, the federal government subsidizes access to new medical
technologies through programs like Medicare and Medicaid, which have
generally covered prescription opioids.292 All of these factors suggest that the
value of proprietary pricing is more attenuated in markets for pain and addiction

288 E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole, Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1971,
1972-75 (2012).
289 See, e.g., supra notes 111–118 and accompanying text.
290 See generally CHOICE, BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND ADDICTION (Rudy E. Vuchinich
& Nick Heather eds., 2003).
291 See Donna M. Windish et al., Medicine Residents’ Understanding of the Biostatistics and Results in
the Medical Literature, 298 JAMA 1010 (2007) (finding that on average, medicine residents
answered only 8 of 20 questions correctly on a multiple-choice test about statistical methods and
interpretation of research outcomes).
292 See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
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treatments than in many other contexts, lessening concerns about some of the
policy options discussed below.
2. Carve-Outs, Buy-Outs, and March-Ins
Sky-high sticker prices for pharmaceutical products such as Evzio are,
we have argued, in part a product of unintended consequences of federal
reimbursement policies—and in particular, the limits on charging CMS more
than the “best price” or the “usual and customary charges” for other payers.293
These rules discourage pharmaceutical companies from offering discounts to
private health insurance plans and pharmacy benefit managers because those
discounts will reduce the amount that the companies can charge the
government. Limits on CMS payments aspire to serve the noble purpose of
protecting the federal fisc from predatory pharmaceutical pricing. In the case of
Evzio, however, these laws appear to have had the unintended consequence of
keeping the drug out of many private health plans and pharmacy benefit
manager formularies while still leaving the government with an enormous bill.
Fortunately, policymakers are not without tools to address the problem.
Specifically, the Affordable Care Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to waive the Medicaid best-price mandate, among other
restrictions, when testing “payment and service delivery models” that “address[]
a defined population for which there are deficits in case leading to poor clinical
outcomes.”294 This authority at least arguably allows the Secretary to create a
carve-out from the best-price mandate for sales of naloxone products to health
plans in the areas hit hardest by the opioid epidemic.295 Exercise of that waiver
authority would encourage Kaléo and its leading competitor, Adapt Pharma’s
naloxone nasal spray Narcan, to strike deals with private health plans that are
currently unwilling to cover the drugs at their list prices.
A bolder approach than a Medicaid best-price carve-out would be for
the federal government to offer to buy the family of Evzio-related patents from
Kaléo and then to place those patents in the public domain.296 One potential
concern with buyouts is that they remove the patent holder’s incentive to invest
in commercialization—though by this point, the publicity surrounding the
naloxone auto-injector may already have accomplished much of what marketing
efforts can achieve. Another, more daunting challenge is how to set the price for
such a buyout. Academics have proposed auction systems to place some market
bound on patent buyout prices, but perhaps the most straightforward approach
for a one-time buyout is for Congress to appropriate a specific amount, in effect
making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the manufacturer. Given that Kaléo does not
See supra notes 203–208 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b), (d)(1).
295 On the scope and limit of the Secretary’s authority to waive the best-price mandate, see
generally Sachs et al., supra note 210, at 14–16.
296 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 563–66, 587 (discussing academic buyout
proposals including Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.
J. ECON. 1137 (1998), as well as how the UK has effectively put these ideas into practice through
its system for purchasing and distributing pharmaceuticals).
293
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appear to be turning a profit from Evzio yet,297 it’s not crazy to think that the
firm would say yes.
Optional patent buyouts are attractive if the optimal buyout price is
higher than the patentee’s expected market return, which may be the case in the
Evzio context given both the product’s positive externalities and Kaléo’s
apparent financial struggles. For unwilling sellers, the government has legal
options to effectively force patent buyouts. If all the relevant patents were created
under federal grants, the government has a license to practice the invention and
can also exercise “march-in” rights to grant additional licenses if “action is
necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied”
by the patentee.298 And for any patent, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 allows the government
and its contractors to manufacture and use the invention “by or for the United
States” in exchange for monetary damages based primarily on the patentee’s
risk-adjusted research and development costs.299 These statutory mechanisms
potentially allow the government to address the problem of “over-reward,”
although the government has shown reluctance to embrace this authority in
other contexts.300
3. Expanding Coverage and Removing Regulatory Hurdles
As discussed in Part I, Medicare and Medicaid generally provided
reimbursements for prescription opioids but not for non-opioid pain treatments
such as acupuncture or behavioral programs, exacerbating the patent-related
distortion toward drugs as opposed to less excludable interventions. Coverage of
non-pharmacological treatments through private insurers has been similarly
limited.301 In addition to incentivizing additional research into these alternative
pain treatments, the government should address this bias by requiring or
subsidizing coverage for these interventions. Moreover, Part I explained how
insufficient insurance coverage has presented a barrier to access not only for non-

See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(4), 203(a)(2). To be sure, march-in rights alone will be of little use
when a product is also covered by private-sector patents. See Rachel Sachs, March-In Rights Alone
Won’t Solve Our Drug Pricing Problems, BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/12/march-in-rights-alone-wont-solve-ourdrug-pricing-problems.
299 See Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 83 (applying to the Evzio context the argument of
Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A Prescription for
Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275 (2016));
see also Letter from Kim Treanor, Knowledge Ecology Int’l, to Kellyanne Conway, Counselor to
the President, and James Carroll, Acting Director, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Conway-Carrol-KEI-1498Evzio-29mar2018.pdf (same).
300 See Ryan Whalen, The Bayh–Dole Act and Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will the
Agencies Ever Go Marching in?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015).
301 See James Heyward et al., Coverage of Nonpharmacologic Treatments for Low Back Pain Among US
Public and Private Insurers, 1 JAMA NETWORK OPEN e183044 (2018).
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opioid pain treatments, but also for pharmaceutical addiction treatments such as
Suboxone.302
Of course, as with government-set innovation incentives, government
interventions on the allocation side raise the risk of political failures, including
rent-seeking and mismanagement.303 Ideally, government interventions in the
innovation ecosystem should counteract the patent system’s biases. But as
illustrated throughout this Article, the federal government’s actual interventions
in the allocation system for pain treatment likely compounded the problems that
facilitated the current crisis.
C. Political Economy of Opioid Innovation Institutions
The opioid crisis dramatically illustrates deep flaws with linking
biomedical innovation incentives to patent-based rewards, but it exposes
inadequacies of non-patent innovation institutions as well. So far, this Article has
illustrated how much purchase we can get on these problems through a law-andeconomics analysis, but we are cognizant that the study of innovation institutions
is about more than financial incentives. The failure of America’s innovation
institutions to encourage the development and dissemination of nonaddictive
pain treatments arose not only from errors of institutional design but also from
deficiencies of political will—deficiencies that non-patent institutions came to
reflect.
To put the point in public choice terms, the diffuse individuals who bear
the costs of underinvestment in nonaddictive pain management—including
chronic pain patients and members of communities ravaged by opioid abuse—
lacked the social and political capital to influence resource allocation that other,
better organized interest groups enjoy. The opioid epidemic has had the most
devastating impact in rural, poor communities with high unemployment 304
(although, as noted, the causal connection between higher unemployment and
higher rates of opioid abuse is difficult to substantiate empirically305). And the
stigma of addiction further limited the political capital of those hardest hit.306 If
addiction had not been a taboo subject and if the first people hit were children
of congressmen rather than politically marginalized groups, there likely would
have been far more political traction to address these problems early on.
302 In addition to gaps in government insurance, private insurance markets have long failed
to cover addiction treatments, which was the motivation for the Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–26, and its extension through the Affordable
Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(j).
303 See, e.g., Lev Facher, Trump Opioid Plan Writes in Favoritism to Single Company’s Addiction
Medication, STAT (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/26/trump-opioidplan-alkermes-vivitrol.
304 See Katherine M. Keyes et al., Understanding the Rural–Urban Differences in Nonmedical
Prescription Opioid Use and Abuse in the United States, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e52 (2014).
305 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
306 See generally MACY, supra note 117, at 8 (explaining how retracing the epidemic across the
Appalachians allowed her to “understand how prescription pill and heroin abuse was allowed to
fester, moving quietly and stealthily across this country, cloaked in stigma and shame”).
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Although political institutions could have done far more to forestall the
present crisis, it is at least promising that drug misuse is now being viewed as a
public health problem, at least in the opioid context. In October 2017, President
Trump declared the opioid crisis to be a national public health emergency,307
and the ensuing President’s Commission on Combatting Drug Addiction and
the Opioid Crisis issued a comprehensive report on addiction prevention and
treatment.308 In contrast, the rise of heroin addiction in the 1970s and crack
cocaine addiction in the 1980s and 1990s were largely viewed as criminal justice
problems rather than public health problems, leading to mass incarceration
rather than mass medical care.309 The difference may reflect racial and class
politics; the press has typically portrayed opioid users as sympathetic white
suburbanites, compared with urban black and Latino heroin users. 310 But
perhaps greater empathy for those fighting opioid addiction will help the public
and policymakers view those suffering from other forms of addiction through a
public health lens.311
Of course, even when opioids began to gain policymakers’ attention,
government interventions were often too small or were misdirected, as illustrated
in Part I. Many of the most significant hurdles to effective policymaking continue
to be political and cultural, such as concerns that many addicts are to blame for
their own plight and thus less worthy of publicly funded assistance, that
scientifically supported medication-assisted treatment is inferior to abstinencebased programs, and that treatment clinics will simply attract more heroin users
307
See The Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE (last visited Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/opioids.
308 CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 10
309 See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
BLACK AMERICA 147 (2017) (arguing that crack cocaine addiction should have been labeled “a
public health disaster” rather than “a criminal justice issue”).
310 See Julie Netherland & Helena B. Hansen, The War on Drugs That Wasn’t: Wasted Whiteness,
“Dirty Doctors,” and Race in Media Coverage of Prescription Opioid Misuse, 40 CULTURE MED. &
PSYCHIATRY 664 (2016); see also Cuéllar & Humphreys, supra note 161 (“Another proffered
explanation is the demographics of prescription drug users: the epidemics of the 1980s and 1990s
affected mainly low-income, African Americans (crack cocaine) and low-income, rural whites
(methamphetamine), whereas the opioid epidemic includes a large representation of middleclass, white individuals with more political and social capital.”). Racial biases may also have been
responsible for shielding nonwhite communities from the brunt of the opioid crisis: nonwhite
patients are less likely to be prescribed opioids for comparable reported pain, See Diana Jill
Burgess et al., Patient Race and Physicians’ Decisions to Prescribe Opioids for Chronic Low Back Pain, 67
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1852 (2008); Mark J. Pletcher et al., Trends in Opioid Prescribing by Race/Ethnicity
for Patients Seeking Care in US Emergency Departments, 299 JAMA 70 (2008). Controlling for income
level, areas with higher proportions of white residents have higher rates of opioid prescriptions
and overdose deaths. See Joseph Friedman et al., Assessment of Racial/Ethnic and Income Disparities in
the Prescription of Opioids and Other Controlled Medications in California, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED.
469 (2019). But this is just a silver lining to broader problem of racial and ethnic disparities in
health care—including, in this case, the undertreatment of pain. See generally INST. OF MED. OF
THE NAT’L ACADS., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2002).
311 Cf. Leigh Ann Caldwell, How Trump Unexpectedly Garnered Bipartisan Support for Criminal Justice
Reform, NBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/how-trumpunexpectedly-garnered-bipartisan-support-criminal-justice-reform-n949706.
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and crime.312 It is not enough to recommend that policymakers fix innovation
institution failures. Innovation institutions are themselves politically produced,
and one reason they failed was because politicians didn’t have sufficient
incentives to design them otherwise.
These problems illustrate the need for research not just on the science of
treating pain and addiction, but also on the science of communicating this
knowledge in ways that overcome existing cultural hurdles.313 Analogies to other
health policy movements may prove instructive. For example, the AIDS
movement is partly a story about patent law incentivizing innovations like novel
antiretroviral medications, but it is also a story about changing norms and
political power. 314 Innovations in cancer therapy require not just scientific
advances but also the political support to fund those research efforts—compare
the amazing success of the pink ribbon movement for breast cancer research315
with the low funding rates for stigmatized lung cancer, 316 even though lung
cancer is the deadliest cancer, killing more Americans than breast cancer,
prostate cancer, and colon cancer combined.317 As opioid deaths have become
higher profile and overdose victims acquire the faces of friends and family
members rather than statistics, there has already been progress.
In the end, the story of the opioid crisis is to a significant extent an
account of failures of institutional design, but it is also a narrative in which the
pathological politics of pain and addiction prevented design changes that could
have helped address the problem. This may be a dispiriting diagnosis: problems
of institutional design are ones that legal scholars can solve, and our analysis
suggests that the roots of the opioid crisis are not so easy to snip. More
optimistically, recognizing the political and cultural determinants of innovation
policy failures will move us incrementally further toward ensuring that those
failures are not relived. But it will no doubt be a long and hard journey.

III. Beyond Opioids: Avoiding Innovation Institution Failures
While our primary focus in this Article is on the ways in which America’s
innovation institutions have contributed to the opioid crisis and can hasten its

See MACY, supra note 120, at 216, 281, 288; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra
note 56, at S-8; German Lopez, Needle Exchanges Help Combat the Opioid Crisis. So Why Was the One
in Orange County Shut Down?, VOX (May 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2018/5/29/17389048/needle-exchange-opioid-epidemic-orange-county.
313 See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE COMMUNICATION
(Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dan Kahan & Dietram A. Scheufele eds., 2017).
314 See generally Julia H. Smith & Alan Whiteside, The History of AIDS Exceptionalism, 13 J. INT’L
AIDS SOC’Y 47 (2010).
315 See Brian Alexander, The Politics Behind the Pink Ribbon, NBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27283197/ns/health-cancer/t/politics-behind-pink-ribbon.
316 See Lecia V. Sequist, Stigma Lingers for Deadliest Cancer, CNN (Oct. 30, 2013),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/health/sequist-lung-cancer-stigma/index.html.
317 Rebecca L. Siegel et al., Cancer Statistics, 2018, 68 CA: CANCER J. CLINICIANS 7 (2018).
312
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end, the opioid epidemic also yields lessons for innovation scholars that apply to
other areas of public health and scientific knowledge.
The stories of OxyContin, Suboxone, and Evzio confirm some truths
that we have long known about the IP system. IP is an effective innovation
incentive for aggregating dispersed information about consumers’ willingness to
pay for new knowledge goods—but when markets fail, so too will IP.318 Two
familiar reasons why markets fail to produce socially optimal outcomes are (1)
the externalization of harms and (2) the externalization of benefits. OxyContin
is an example of a product that generates negative externalities and—
unsurprisingly—we ended up with too much OxyContin. Suboxone and Evzio
are examples of products that generate positive externalities, and—
unsurprisingly—we have ended up with too little of these drugs.
America’s apparent underinvestment in non-pharmacological pain
treatments likewise fits into our existing mental models. Non-pharmacological
pain treatments such as yoga and acupuncture are almost inevitably
nonexcludable and ineligible for patent protection. Our innovation ecosystem is
well designed to reward patentable technologies, such as pharmaceuticals, and
poorly structured to support the development of processes and practices such as
checklists, cognitive behavioral therapy, and alternative medicine.319
Yet in other ways, our study of the opioid crisis has challenged our beliefs
about innovation policy and led us toward new insights. In this final Part, we
highlight five lessons from the opioid context for innovation policy more broadly:
First, we think that the traditional view of IP as a tradeoff between
dynamic efficiency and allocative efficiency is less accurate than we once
believed. 320 In the case of OxyContin, patent protection appears to have
encouraged Purdue Pharma’s extraordinary investment in demand creation.
Aggregate data on the consumption of patented and post-patent
pharmaceuticals suggests that the OxyContin story is not an outlier in this
regard.321 Especially when a pharmaceutical manufacturer follows a relatively
standard pricing strategy (such that the product is available to Medicaid and
Medicare beneficiaries and is included in most private health plan formularies),
above-marginal-cost pricing seems less likely to prevent the vast majority of U.S.
patients from gaining access than conventional IP models suggest.
Second, and relatedly, the fact that IP encourages demand creation
should affect our view of IP’s overall welfare effects. Do we want to encourage
patentees to create demand for products for which demand does not currently
exist? There are, perhaps, cases in which the answer is yes—for example, Eli
Lilly’s promotion of Prozac arguably generated greater attention toward

See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 21, at 555–56.
See generally Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 23.
320 See supra notes 24, 97–100 and accompanying text.
321 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
318
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untreated depression.322 But we should be aware that the patent system creates
incentives for firms to promote products that consumers did not know they
wanted (and indeed might not have needed).323
Third, the interaction between IP and addiction can be particularly
pernicious. As we sought to illustrate in Section I.B.1, firms have an especially
strong incentive to promote habit-forming products—perhaps by initially
charging below-marginal-cost prices—if they anticipate that they can maintain
a medium- to long-term monopoly over that product. When the habit-formingnature of a product generates negative externalities, as is the case for medical
addiction, the combination of this effect with the more general demand-creation
incentives can have devastating social consequences. It is possible that this
misalignment of IP rewards with social welfare could be addressed by reforms
internal to IP. For example, Michael Risch has called for a revitalization of
patent law’s utility requirement to deny patents on inventions from which society
reaps no benefit (even if the innovator can reap significant profits).324 Margo
Bagley has suggested legislative restrictions on patentable subject matter to
revive moral utility doctrine and move away from the United States’s current
(and distinctively American) “patent first, ask questions later” approach.325 As
another example, Ted Sichelman suggests that patent law remedies should be
reformed to better reflect the social value, not market value, of an invention.326
But non-IP innovation institutions also have an important—and perhaps
paramount—role to play in correcting the IP system’s biases.327
A fourth lesson from the opioid crisis for other areas of innovation policy
is that the notion that government subsidies can promote access to IP-protected
products turns out to be less than clear-cut. Medicaid’s best-price mandate
incentivizes pharmaceutical firms to charge higher prices to the private sector,
and as the number of patients covered by Medicaid increases, so too does the
See generally Bradley T. Shapiro, Positive Spillovers and Free Riding in Advertising of Prescription
Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Antidepressants, 126 J. POL. ECON. 381 (2018).
323 See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1665–66 (2013) (discussing and critiquing the
conventional view that consumption equates to welfare).
324 See Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1195 (2010); Michael Risch,
A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57 (2011). Effectively addressing social
problems would likely require a more dynamic utility requirement because many social
downsides do not surface until long after patent filing.
325 Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003). Bagley’s focus is social concerns with patents grounded in
morality rather than negative externalities, but some hybrid of these concerns has in fact driven
judicial changes in patentable subject matter. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject
Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1118–25 (2015).
326 Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014).
327 Using validity doctrines such as utility to weed out socially harmful patents would be both
administratively challenging for patent examiners and would not help with inventions that create
negative externalities but have a net social benefit. And tailoring remedies may be difficult as
well; for example, Mark Lemley called Sichelman’s proposal “a perfectly correct statement of
aspirations, but nothing that could ever be operationalized without perfect knowledge.” Mark
Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 107, 112 (2014).
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incentive for firms to set private-sector prices with Medicaid in mind. This is not
an argument against Medicaid expansion, and removing the best-price mandate
without creating an alternative means to control government drug spending
would lead to different (and perhaps worse) pathologies. But it does suggest that
government subsidies should be designed with attention to their impact on
private pharmaceutical pricing.
Indeed, in a world without Medicaid’s best-price mandate or other limits
on incentives to offer discounts to some purchasers, pharmaceutical firms might
seek to maximize profits through price discrimination (i.e., seeking to ensure that
every consumer who values a product at more than its marginal cost will be
charged her willingness to pay and no more). Perfect price discrimination entails
no deadweight loss. Medicaid changes the incentive to engage in price
discrimination, however, because the lowest price charged to other purchasers
becomes the ceiling for Medicaid reimbursement. The limit on charging CMS
more than the “usual and customary charges to the general public” has a similar
effect.328 In such cases, IP does lead to serious allocative inefficiencies, but the
inefficiencies are because of the way IP interacts with other government policies.
To be sure, perfect price discrimination will almost never be possible, and
deadweight loss in the IP system is inevitable. But the opioid crisis illustrates that
subsidies can do as much to increase deadweight loss as to reduce it.
Finally, and notwithstanding our criticisms of the IP system, we again
emphasize that non-IP innovation incentives and allocation mechanisms are
imperfect. In the case of the opioid epidemic, CMS created powerful non-IP
incentives for hospitals to prescribe more opioids.329 That turned out to be a
disaster. The root causes of this particular policy failure are unclear, but we
should be cognizant in our critique of certain aspects of market-based IP policies
that the grass is not always greener on the non-market side.

Conclusion
The opioid epidemic is not the first public health crisis that has exposed
flaws in innovation institutions. The global AIDS crisis drew the world’s eyes
toward high prices for patented antiretroviral therapies (ARTs) and highlighted
ways in which international IP law limited the ability of low-income countries to
respond to health emergencies. The episode resulted in the World Trade
Organization issuing its Doha Declaration in 2001, which in turn led to the
loosening of restrictions in low- and middle-income countries on access to
generic versions of lifesaving drugs. 330 Around the same time as the Doha
Declaration, the anthrax attacks in the United States also placed a spotlight on
patent law’s allocative inefficiencies and resulted in Bayer A.G., the
See supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 220–226 and accompanying text.
330 See Ellen ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access to Medicines
for All, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 15 (2011); Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 828–29 (2008).
328
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manufacturer of the anthrax medicine Cipro, cutting prices steeply.331 A crisis—
as Nobel laureate economist Paul Romer once said—is a terrible thing to
waste,332 and innovation policy scholars and reformers did not let these earlier
crises meet that fate.
Crisis-based policymaking raises the obvious concern that lawmakers
and bureaucrats will sacrifice sense for speed. Yet the opioid epidemic, like AIDS
but unlike the anthrax scare, is a crisis whose timeline is marked in months and
years rather than hours or days. An optimistic scenario is that the crisis’s
comparatively slow movement will allow for the sort of careful contemplation
that crisis-based policymaking often lacks, while the crisis’s magnitude will
overcome the legislative inertia that often stands in the way of innovation policy
change. We ourselves lack the political predictive powers to say whether
institutional reform will be the ultimate outcome or whether instead legislative
interest in the subject will wane.
What we can say with confidence is that close consideration of the
interaction between innovation institutions and the opioid epidemic has the
potential to reveal important aspects of each. This is not to say that the opioid
epidemic is entirely attributable to innovation policy or that the flaws of the
innovation system are all at work in the opioid crisis. It is to say, however, that
one cannot fully comprehend the causes of the opioid epidemic without
understanding the role that innovation institutions played in it, and one’s
understanding of innovation institutions will almost certainly be enhanced by
attention to opioid problem. The epidemic already has wasted far too many lives
and laid waste to communities across the country. Hopefully the opportunities
for reflection and reform that can come from the crisis will not be squandered as
well.

See Brennan et al., supra note 299, at 303 (describing the government’s threat of importing
generic versions of the drug under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which led to Bayer’s price reduction); Keith
Bradsher with Edmund L Andrews, U.S. Says Bayer Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/24/business/a-nation-challenged-ciprous-says-bayer-will-cut-cost-of-its-anthrax-drug.html.
332 See Jack Rosenthal, On Language: A Terrible Thing to Waste, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 31,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t.html.
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